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ABSTRACT 
The thesis attempts to show the complexity of the literary challenge 
which Chaucer undertook in the House of Fame. Firstly, I establish a 
sense of the tradition of criticism inspired by the poem, and then show 
the ramifications of the choice of medium. The poem is a "dream 
vision", a genre which took the contentious truth-claims and unsettled 
status of dreams, and used it as the foundation for a poetics which 
concentrated on the relation of the conscious subject to truth. This is 
investigated in an extended metaphor, where the experience of the 
unconscious subject in a purely linguistic world is tested, and from the 
experiment, conclusions may be drawn concerning the human condition with 
regard to all knowledge. I briefly examine the divergent positions of 
the Divine Comedy and the Romance of the Rose, situating Chaucer in the 
debt of both, but philosophically in the French camp. The House of Fame 
I see as a "deconstruction" of any position of certainty in rational or 
mystical epistemology, which marks out a secular sphere of influence for 
literature in the manner of Ovid. The second half of the thesis is 
largely a close reading of the poem itself, which attempts to trace the 
development of these "skeptical" ideas in literary form, showing hO\•I, by 
appealing to the whole European literary inheritance, the force of the 
argument is enhanced in subtlety, range and wit. Love, Nature, and 
Fame, the three topoi of the three books, are each in turn unsettled, as 
too are the three "ways of knowing" - perception, reason, and memory. 
The poem does not "end" in the traditional mode of closure largely 
because it has made such a notion an impossible ideal, beyond the reach 
of the unaided human mind. 
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MY SWEVEN FOR TO TELLE ARYGHT 
"O God comma I abhor self consciousness" 
John Barth, Lost in the Fun House. 
Unfinished poems and old mysteries are generally tantalizing. Chaucer's 
House of Fame has both these advantages, and an investigation of its 
secrets opens onto a fascinating world of forgotten concepts and 
debates, which, on closer inspection, turn out to be the very issues at 
the centre of a good deal of our contemporary explorations of language 
and, especially, literature. 
The poem is unfinished in common with much of the Chaucerian opus - The 
Legend of Good Women, Anelida and Arcite, and the great Canterbury 
Tales, all come to us incomplete. Each represents a literary challenge 
which either bored or finally defeated its author. The abrupt ending of 
the House of Fame however seems to be almost mimetic of an inte1·1ectual 
impasse which develops in the course of the dream vision and which 
precludes it achieving a satisfactory conclusion. The rumoured "man of 
great authority" never appears, and never can appear, to resolve the 
conundrums of the text. 
4 
The reason for this is simple and complex. Simply, Chaucer cannot go 
any farther than the end of the poem. He has, at this point, exhausted 
the possibilities for truth offered by language, and, in the theoretical 
frame he has established, cannot produce any credible authority to elude 
the constraints of speech and texts. The process by which he has 
reached this dead end is complex to the point of being labyrinthine -
indeed,the labyrinth is one of the overarching metaphors which runs 
through the work - for it evokes the profound difficulties in the whole 
apparatus of communicating and recording the transient thoughts which 
run continually through the mind. Speech acts are shown to be governed 
by fantasy and projection in the account of Dido and Aeneas, a positive 
hindrance to truth and self-recognition, inextricably bound up in 
literary models and discourses of power. In conversation with the Eagle 
who bears the narrator to the heavens, language as a signifying system 
is shown to be divorced from its physical being in the realm of nature. 
Sound is governed by the immutable physical laws of "Kynde". Language, 
as ordered and signifying sound, falls under the hegemony of "Crafte" -
a blanket term for human constructs which are all driven by desire and 
imagination. In Fame's house we see the random fate of linguistic 
artefacts when subjected to the arbitrary processes of history, and the 
impossibility of finding transcendant truth in human narratives. At the 
end of this comprehensive deconstruction of the metaphysical 
capabilities of language "there ys namoore to seye". Chaucer's 
fragments and ruins house only the suggestive ghost and memory of 
"authority". 
Chaucer employs the dream vision as a metaphor for the area of his 
exploration and as the generic vehicle for the poem. This establishes a 
binary opposition between the contrary states of consciousness and sleep 
equivalent to that between the real and fictional worlds. In sleep, the 
constraints of reality are abandoned and replaced by the workings of an 
inexplicable unconscious - Chaucer implies the reverse of Lacan's 
famous dictum, and demonstrates that language (and literature in 
particular) is structured "like the unconscious" rather than after the 
model of rational consciousness. 
To reinforce our awareness of separation from "common-sense'', the 
tutelary deities of each section of the poem are feminine, and 
consequently "other'' to the masculine narrator. The narratorial voice 
attempts to establish canons of "right" interpretation and "accurate" 
reporting and is defeated by the dynamics of the dream, where the 
hideous goddess Fame despatches honest men to oblivion, Venus makes 
heroes into liars, and benevolent Nature is oblivious to human 
aspirations. The world of words is strictly rhetorical and therefore 
contingent, transitory, and feminine. To quote Catullus: 
" ... mul ier ... quod ... di cit 
in vento et rapida scribere oportet aqua." 
Carmina, LXXII. 
In the last analysis, the House of Fame is a nightmare of entrapment 
within a self-referential system of signification, a kind of literary 
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solipsism which has implications for all knowledge. The human subject 
is so conditioned in the habit of seeing or saying what it desires or 
expects, that reality is an habitual projection of a self-generated 
fantasy. Consequently, dream and fiction come more accurately to 
resemble one's experience of reality than models derived from the 
scientific project or the natural order. This awareness is fashioned 
into the structure of the poem; its tripartite nature may be read as an 
echo of the three modes of cognition which constituted the mediaeval 
model of epistemology (perception and imagination, reason, and memory), 
each of which is paralysed and distorted by the fact that the events are 
experienced by a mind overcome by sleep - the dream of reason produces 
monsters. 
Mapping the texture of dreams onto crucial areas of knowledge and 
tradition awakes the ''cultural unconscious". None of the assumptions of 
the narratives of power which make up a literary heritage or 
authoritative history survive Chaucer's foray into the territory of 
Fame. Inevitably, this begs the question; "what of the human subject?". 
Are our self-perceptions also no more than the chance collections of 
inchoate forces, natural and unnatural? There can be no final answer to 
such questionings in life or in art. 
" ... We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on; and our little 
Life is rounded with a s 1 eep ... " 
AND EVERY WIGHT THAT I SAW THERE 
ROUNED EVERYCH IN OTHERES ERE 
A NEWE TYDYNG ... 
The lack of an end to the poem leaves the reader in a more than usually 
exposed position. To complete the contract that texts generally expect 
(closure, that is) the reader is obliged to intervene self-consciously 
and assume the role of author. In other words, the House of Fame is a 
Barthesian "texte Jcdsib7e" par exce77ence, and demands to be written, 
as well as read, when the author (prematurely) expires. Kittredge, 
expressing his pleasure at the fact that the poem gave his imagination 
exercise in completing it, was being directed towards the hermeneutical 
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concerns and metalinguistic quandaries encoded into the poem by its very 
structure (1). This ancient trap lures the reader into the dream as 
interpreter and also subject of the narrative. 
The tantalising nearness of a resolution has tempted generations of 
critics, lured by an ancient suspense, to offer their own neat 
conclusions, in effect casting themselves in the shadowy role of that 
authoritarian figure who is the final arbiter of meaning. But like the 
spurious ending of the Caxton-Thynne edition with its twelve lines of 
inconclusive conclusion, these endings have not brought the poem to 
order, and it continues to resist "closure" from any source. The joke 
is that each reader projects "his" reading onto the blank space at the 
end of the text, and in the process is effectively "analysed" by that 
which he set out to analyse. 
In the past, prevailing intellectual fashions have provided endings (now 
in itself an unfashionable habit) in hypotheses 
which betray their own dominant concerns - some might say "neuroses". 
An older school of critics (steeped in Rankean historiography) took 
themselves to the circumstances which produced the poem, in the belief 
that unearthing a real formative event would dissipate the fantastical 
element of the poem and produce "meaning"; just as rightly assembled 
facts displaced Myths and replaced them with History. So the work was 
read as an "occasional'' poem which Chaucer was supposed to have written 
to mark, for example, the wooing of Anne of Bohemia (2), or to expose a 
scandal concerning John of Gaunt (3). The antiquarian interest of these 
several hypotheses failed to tidy away the real challenges of the text, 
and the deus ex machina appearances of various historical figures 
appears contrived and unconvincing. 
An alternative way of reading is to examine the shape of the work. The 
philological tradition attempts to harmonise the poem with one or other 
generic framework, out of which general structures the specific nature 
of this example could be deduced. Nineteenth century opinion was that 
the poem was what Lydgate had referred to as "Dant in Ynglyssh", in 
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other words a satirical rewriting of the Djvjne Comedy and its 
tripartite revelations (4). In disagreement, other critics traced its 
pedigree as a Love Vision of the French tradition which included the 
Roman de la Rose (5), and still others have categorised it as a 
philosophical discourse in the style of Alan de Lille with Boethian 
underpinnings (6) or as an imitation of the Corbaccjo and satire on 
women (7). 
In subsequent years, scholars have repeatedly produced diffident "men of 
authority" from the literary wings as evidence of the principal 
influence dominant in the poem. Baker prompted Virgil forward (8), 
Ruggiers suggested Boethius (9), Goffin, Boccaccio (10). Koonce 
reverently disclnses the presence of Christ or his surrogate, a priest 
(11), and Winny produces Chaucer himself in the last resort, a wry smile 
playing about his features (12). 
But the text is not just a perfect crime adorned by an absent Macavity. 
Other critics have suggested that the ''man who wasn't there" isn't 
supposed to be, and ought to stay away (13). A single authority is what 
the text simply does not have, and even should one be unearthed, the 
carefully prepared elusiveness which informs the writing would preclude 
it from dominating the poem as a unified whole. Made wary of the bland 
assumption of closure and the pitfalls of monolithic readings, modern 
readers have found the House of Fame, along with the rest of the 
Chaucerian canon, to be replete with an awareness of self-reflexivity, 
labyrinthine complexity, inter-textuality, and positively entropic 
inconclusiveness. It has been a bracing confirmation of the 
problematics central to contemporary conceptions of reading and a timely 
justification of the relevence of Mediaeval texts to these, no doubt 
burning, and certainly publishable, issues. 
The reaction against prescriptive reading may be seen in the way 
conclusions reached by B.G. Koonce have been overturned. Koonce, 
representing the ''exegetical" approach, assumes the influence of Dante 
and proceeds to interpret the poem in the allegorical method of the 
Schools, an enterprise which leads inexorably to the discovery of 
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religious truth at the core of the text, and insists upon Chaucer's 
saturation in the complex hermeneutics of the Friars. The four-fold, 
polysemous nature of the "Mediaeval Imagination" is taken as absolute 
and fundamental to all writing in the period, including all of Chaucer 
(14). Koonce's methodology maps the goals and methods of Dante on to 
the poem regardless of the parodic or evasive techniques employed, and 
ignores the enormous achievement of the Commedia in naturalising and 
harmonising its subject matter within one philosophical paradigm. His 
reading, although ingenious, is partial and prejudiced. It neglects the 
vital attention due to the problematics of signs and ways of writing 
which were, at the least, contemporaneous with any fourteenth century 
author. Worse, it misses the fun of the poet's dilemma and, in so 
doing, its real seriousness. 
Recent work has enriched our knowledge of a larger field of reference, 
and helped to show that Chaucer was not part of a monolithic cultural 
moment dominated entirely by naif faith and realism. Piero Boitani has 
placed the poem within the entire tradition of Fame in the Western and 
Middle Eastern world (15). Sheila Delany has probed its philosophical 
credentials and assigned it to the somewhat uncomfortable niche of 
"skeptical fideism" within the collapse of the Mediaeval intellectual 
consensus (16). Jacqueline Miller has alerted us to the conventional 
Mediaeval requirements for legitimate parentage even in one's literary 
offspring and the consequent textual power-play between author and 
authority ( 17). 
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If it can be said that a critical consensus has been reached at present, 
it is that Chaucer here is indeed diligent "To shewe craft" (HoF, 1100) 
and that, in some way, "The whole work is a vindication of poetry" - the 
opinion of a scholar as independent of fashion as J.A.W. Bennett (18). 
Clearly, the poem is beyond argument "literary". That is, it is 
learned, widely allusive, sophisticatedly witty, parodical and aware of 
its uncertain place in a new and malleable English literary tradition. 
The dream form which is employed has come to be seen as mimetic of 
literature as a whole, rather than a merely convenient generic form 
(19). But the poem is more than a brilliant exercise. It is a serious 
attempt to lay the foundations for a poetics, and the fruits of the 
attempt are to be seen at their best in the Canterbury Tales. Chaucer 
is learning how to write as a fallible human being in a delicate and 
restrictive medium, incapable of grand claims to truth and 
enlightenment. In doing so, he is deliberately avoiding an alternative 
tradition of letters which attempts to rise above the inherent 
limitations of language and produce "truth" in a transcendant way, as if 
unbounded by the medium in which it is expressed. 
Chaucer takes seriously the radical nature of the Fall. In that cosmic 
calamity, language too fell and acquired the opacity of the material 
creation in place of primal transparency. Signifiers lost their 
absolute and spiritual connexion with their signifieds, leaving words as 
merely material objects, a shadow of their former glory, full of 
uncertainty and confusion. The evils of Babel are only to be undone by 
the work of the creative Logos. It is no accident that the House of 
Fame echoes the Apocalypse. In that final moment of history, the 
division between truth and falsehood will become obvious and absolute 
when he who is Alpha and Omega will "take the book and open the seals 
thereof''. In Fame's sublunary Revelation there is nothing but the 
confused sound of words at the mercy of the elements, swept about in a 
far from crystal sea. 
There is no abatement in the battle of words and meanings. The dilemmas 
of the House of Fame are those of all who speak, read, and write, 
reminding any who would imagine that there was anything new under the 
sun that Chaucer's traditional appelation; "Father of English letters'' 
refers not only to his ontological position, but to the fact that he 
located and shaped our understanding of the essence of what it means to 
read and write . As Ezra Pound observes; 
'' ... no one will ever gauge or measure English Poetry until they 
know how much of it, how full a gamut of its qualities, is already 
there on the page of Chaucer." (20) 
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SO WONDERFUL A DREAM 
The House of Fame is self consciously, indeed ostentatiously, presented 
as a dream. The sections labelled by Robinson as "Proem" and 
''Invocation" are entirely devoted to the nature, definition, 
interpretation, and problems of recounting, the phenomenon. Fifty lines 
of 
are devoted to the taxonomy and scientific appraisalAdream data, during 
which the narrator proclaims his ignorance and displays his knowledge in 
the devices of dubitatio, and the captatio benevolentiae -
"For hyt is wonder, be the rood 
To my wit, what causes swevenes ... " (Hof, 2-3) 
The narrative proceeds systematically, as if following the outline of an 
approved treatise. Varieties ("gendres") of dreams are tabulated as 
including: 
- avision, - sweven, 
- revelation, - fantome, 
- drem, and - oracle (Hof, 7-11). 
The 11 distaunce 11 between dreams and times of occurrence needsalso to be 
noted (Hof, 17-19). 
Possible causes are listed also. Specific experiences may be the 
results of 
- complexion, - "feblenesse of brayn 11 , 
- abstinence, - illness, 
overwork, or - paranoia ("inly ful of drede"), 
(Hof, 21-31). 
Dreamers, although found among all sorts and conditions of men, are 
especially to be found among those devoted to the "supreme fictions": 
scholars "to curious in studye" (Hof, 29-30), 
- religious contemplatives iifd mystics (31-35), 
- lovers "that hopen over-muche or dreden" (36-38). 
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As a general theory of dreams, the following triad is offered (HoF, 39-
48): 
- they are simply the simulacra of sense impressions gleaned while 
waking and rehearsed mechanically in sleep, 
- they are produced by spirits which invade the mind when its 
conscious resistance is lowered, 
- they are the result of "memories" retained by the soul of its pre-
incarnate existence, a Neoplatonic theory which held that the 
"soule ... be so parfit ... that yt forwot that ys to come". This wisdom is 
imparted "be avisiouns or be figures" which may be prophetic, but 
requires interpretation. 
By now the narrator is thoroughly flustered and, having avoided 
conscription by any of his paradigms, tails off rather lamely. 
Authority in these matters, he avers, is the property of "grete clerkes" 
and he is of "noon opinion". In any case, he piously reiterates "(God) 
turne us every drem to goode t" (HoF, 1/54). 
Disconcertingly, this burst of benign eclecticism is followed by a 
series of blood-curdling denunciations for any who misinterpret the 
dream in "malicious entencion" or in 
" ... hate, or scorn, or thorgh envye, 
Di spit or jape, or vilanye ... " (HoF, 93/96-7) 
These are wished a 11 the harm that has ever happened to anyone "syth the 
world began" (HoF, 100). Now, not only does this sit ill with some one 
who has just received an illuminative vision and who ought to be "bet in 
charyte" for the experience (HoF, 108), but it leaves the reader in a 
peculiar dilemma. If the narrator himself cannot be sure of the status 
of the dream, how can the reader possibly avoid misinterpretation? 
Leaving this unresolved, the story begins. 
The model of description which is followed appears to owe much to 
Macrobius' Commentary on the "Somnium Scipionis" of Cicero, and critics 
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have used this source to reinforce their own conclusions about the text. 
Koonce assumes that the dream is a "revelation", a category which 
corresponds to Macrobius' "visiones" or true oracles. In consequence, 
the text becomes a semi-sacred revelation (21). Delanj insists that 
the narrator suffered from a "phantome" (Macrobius' "phantasmata") which 
beaq no validity, and that his dream is merely "a free-floating quantum 
of psychic energy" (22). In fact, as Alison Peden notes, there is 
little evidence that Macrobius was much used in the fourteenth century, 
and Chaucer may have been employed the reference as a deliberate 
archaism (23). 
The real point of the Proem, however, is that it should produce 
confusion and evade clarity even as it attempts precision. The 
continual and pointless hair-splitting ends up collapsing meaning 
altogether, and the narrator surrenders to a chaos which is more easily 
described than mastered (24). The only conclusion left is the 
singularly unhelpful one that no dream is ever an unequivocally 
trustworthy event in itself. Where then does one situate the House of 
Fame? 
Perhaps Chaucer's most accomplished brush with dream theory is in the 
Nun's Priest's Tale, where he teases out the ramifications of this very 
dilemma in the form of a fabliau. 
SEYDE HE NAT THUS, "NE DO NO FORS OF DREMES?" 
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The Nun's Priest's Tale is, by this reading, an interpretive battle over 
the validity of treating dreams as message-bearing texts. In it the 
conseil de femme of the sensible Pertelot is based on a physiological 
and skeptical conception of ;swevenys". They are, for her, the mental 
equivalent of dyspepsia. Her opinion is answered at considerable length 
by Chauntecleer, whose position is that dreams do indeed bear meaning. 
He substantiates that position by recourse to authorities and 
"ensamples". What the ensuing story offers is a chance to expose either 
hypothesis to the verification principle which fulfilment of the dream 
in actual experience would provide. The course of events is as follows: 
Chauntecleer awakes, his "herte ... soore afright" (VII, 4085) having 
seen a black hound-like creature with glowing eyes and menacing visage. 
His wife is heartily shocked at his cowardice and, to encourage him 
(somewhat incongruously) to "play the man", gives him an accomplished 
diagnostic catalogue of the causes of natural dreams. Her logic is 
medically flawless. 
11 Swevenes engendren of replecciouns 
And oft of fume and of complecciouns 
Whan humours been too habundant in a wight" 
(VII, 4i13-5) 
Her spouse has either an excess of "rede colera" which may cause dreams 
of biting monsters, or of "malencolic" which summmons up visions of 
predatory black bears and devils. 
This being so, the remedy is clearly purgation. Chauntecleer is 
"choleryk" of complexion, and in view of the rising sun, might itJell 
break out in a tertiary fever (the only likely ill his dream forbodes). 
A dose of "wormes" or 
"of lawriol, centaure, and fumetere 
Or elles of ellebor ... 
Of katapuce, or of gaitrys beryis, 
Of herbeyve" (VII, 4152-6) 
will serve as an emetic and indirectly exorcise his mental delusions. 
With a show of restrained courtesy, the injured rooster replies, thanks 
his wife for her advice, and politely declines it. His preferred 
interpretation is based on literary tradition, an entirely superior mode 
of thought which concerns itself less with causes and remedies than with 
significance and interpretation. The division of op1n1on is entirely 
apt. As Chauntecleer considers himself the centre of the universe and a 
bird of more than paltry intelligence, it appears fitting to him that he 
should be warned of impending doom and that his experience be 
textualized as an avian aoocalyptic. Pertelot, more modest and, likr 
many a wife, more practical than her husband, wishes to deal with the 
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disturbing dream in the least bothersome fashion by denying it the 
slightest import. 
Chauntecleer at once proceeds to recount an exemplum {from Cicero's De 
Divinatione) of a prophetic dream, nods in the direction of Macrobius, 
calls up the mythological/historical tales of Croesus and Andromache, 
and notes the important scriptural precedents of Daniel and the dream-
ridden Joseph. This flood of information, we note, is called up equally 
by the fear of "laxatyves" and desire to "fether" Pertelot as by an 
urgent search for truth. Before long, the cock resumes his quotidian 
farmyard pleasures, and the contretemps is abandoned. 
The joke of the debate lies partly in the half truth and ambivalence of 
the pair's authorities. Pertelote does not end her quotation from Cato: 
"somnia ne cures" concludes "nam fallunt somnia plures". Chauntecleer 
omits to mention Cicero's fierce opposition to the Stoical practice of 
slavish dream divination in the very work from which he quotes. Both 
are play-acting and manipulating their source-texts, imperfect 
proponents of their schools. But the proof of the pudding lies in the 
eating, or in this case, the escape from being eaten. When Chauntecleer 
is confronted by the object of his natural fears, Daun Russell the fox, 
he makes no connexion with the supernatural warning he has so stoutly 
defended. And, far from proving the literary expert, he fails to 
recognize one of the oldest ploys in the repertoire of fable {the Gallus 
et Vulpes trick). Pertelote too is scarcely the hardbitten pragmatist 
she has claimed to be, throwing herself into the fire as a woeful and 
consciously "literary" diversion. She 
" ... shright ... 
Ful louder than did Hasdrubales wyf" {VII, 3364). 
The tale dissolves into anarchic chaos, where predictive or dyspeptic 
dreams are subsumed under the directionless hullaballo of the immediate. 
Carnival displaces clerisy, and Chauntecleer is given a sound lesson in 
the interpreting of representations and the delusive power of pride. 
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" ... I shrewe myself, bathe bloode and bones 
If thou bigyle me ofter than ones 
... thurgh thy fl aterye" 
(VII, 3427-9) 
The point of this long diversion is to hi3hl~ht the importance of dreams 
as a crucial test case for the whole interpretative project. 
Chauntecleer's dream, he claims, has force because a textual tradition 
exists to say it does in the same way that Scripture or a literary canon 
validates certain ideas and forms of expression. His experience makes 
sense within that tradition, and relieves him of the twin perils of 
insignificance in the overall scheme of things and of the anomie of not 
knowing what to make of his experience (Chaucer, as usual, maintains his 
discreet and ironic distance). 
Every dream when remembered or retold becomes a linguistic rather than a 
psychological entity. A double process of mimesis precedes any reading 
of a dream - it is initially an entirely "fictional" and unconscious 
event in the sleeping mind, made of words stored in the memory 
("Thought") which mimic the reality they represent. After the dream, a 
narrator must once again reconstitute the verbal product in language and 
in the conventions of narration. 
The House of Fame cannot be a "real" dream. Despite its rhetorical 
protestations, it is only a specimen of a convention which makes use of 
the empirical experience of dreams for literary purposes. The House of 
Fame looks for validation to the same two contexts which are in conflict 
in the Nun's Priest's Tale. The first is the "scientific" attempt (the 
term includes philosophy) to discover the nature of the dream and its 
potentialities. The second is the literary tradition where dreams carry 
significances beyond the capacities of normal cognition. Both hold out 
the possibility that non-rational perception may help explain the 
condition and destiny of the human race. 
Whether dreams bear any significance, and if so, what significance, is 
an issue unsolved even today, when they have been subjected to a 
scrutiny previously unparalled. Largely on the uncertain foundation of 
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the evidence they offer, at least one of the great myths of our century, 
the Psychoanalytic project - Freudian, Jungian, and Lacanian - has been 
built. The House of Fame is confronting _similar systems which claim to 
have found areas of knowledge outside of the common, fallible order of 
experience, and asking the eternal question: "How can you possibly 
know?" 
DREAMS: A DARKLING PLAIN? 
"Sunt geminae somni portae: quarum altera fertur 
cornea, qua veris facilis datur existus umbris, 
altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, 
sed falsa ad caelum mittunt insomnia manes. 
Virgil, Aeneid VI 893-98. 
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Artemidorus of Daldis, that indefatiguable second century researcher, 
collated the dreams of his ancient contemporaries from criminals and 
athletes to rhetors and 
knights. To order this material, he adopted a system of classification 
which had a long history ahead of it. He assumed five types of dreams: 
Dreams - which hide messages in figures, 
Visions - images reproduced from everyday life, 
Oracles - which are revelations received directly from 
paranormal forces, 
Phantasies - vain imaginings brought on by physical disorders, and 
Apparitions - chimerical forebodings, self-engendered by fancy 
(25). 
This range of alternative readings in fact allowed almost any 
significance, or lack of significance, to be assigned to dreams. 
Authorities of the utmost distinction disagreed violently on the matter. 
Platonic opinion was generally favourable to the idea of an enlightening 
dream (26), Aristoteleans regarded them as interesting quirks of the 
dormant mind, but without intrinsic significance (27). The Stoics were 
slavish and habitual dream readers, and Cicero, in reaction to them, 
condemned the whole practice as superstitious folly (28). 
The religious practices of the pagan world which involved dream reading 
and ecstatic visions (the Oracles, Incubation, and the concept of 
immanent divinities like Pan) brought the nascent Christian Church into 
conflict with the dream diviners and, by association, with dreams 
themselves as psychic phenomena (29). The Greeks expected their Gods to 
appear to them, awake or asleep, in regular epiphanies, and the shock of 
collision between the old pagan and the new christian worlds is nicely 
dramatized in the account of Paul and Barnabas in the city of Lystra, in 
Asia Minor. The pair healed a cripple, and were at once taken by the 
crowd for the gods Zeus and Hermes and worshipped (30). Two 
supernatural world views which valued the incorporeal above the material 
took issue over the truth claims of their revelations. Final victory 
belonged to the Christian Realist discourse. 
The Faith rested on solidly historical foundations. Incarnation and 
Resurrection were naked facts, revealed to witnesses, preserved in 
creeds and texts, and to be believed of all at face value. The Church 
insisted on a simple, direct relationship between word and event, and in 
the sufficiency of texts to say what they meant. In this scheme of 
things, additional _invasions of reality by ecstacies of any kind could 
be at best mere refinements of revealed truth, or at worst, the work of 
the "father of lies''. Enthusiastic visionaries might threaten the 
central pillars of doctrine. The arcane projections of believers, even 
holy martyrs like Perpetua, could eventually lead to ecstatic cults and 
heresy - as happened in the case of Montanus - or be uncomfortably 
reminiscent of Pagan hermetic practices (31). Dream interpreters were 
consequently banished from baptism, and only recognisably scriptural 
dreams allowed a limited cognisance. Prophets reported their messages 
to bishops, who decided their validity. In fine, the church wanted a 
simple, sacramental discourse, purged of insubordinate inferences to 
serve as a vehicle for a truth that was at once empirically and 
spiritually true. It also provided a paradox at the centre of the 
tradition. Christianity is supernaturally revealed, parts of it 
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ecstatically vouchsafed; how could it both retain this window on eternal 
certainty and close it off to any future intruders? 
It is in some ways a peculiar irony of History that a dream 
turned Christianity into a world religion. When Constantine saw his 
vision of the cross and became a Catholic emperor, he ushered in a 
period in which claims identical to his would come under unsympathetic 
scrutiny, and the power of the state be harnessed by religious orthodoxy 
into keeping these awkward phenomena at bay. 
ONE CHURCH, ONE FAITH, ONE GOD. 
The history of control over the dream-lives of the faithful is a record 
marking the development of an intellectual and political hegemony. The 
scriptures themselves do not allow certainty in the matter of 
involuntary "seeings" in the form of dreams and visions; rather, they 
show the conflict between monolithic orthodoxy and individual 
revelation. Dreams are not collective phenomena, but the property of 
lone visionaries, often in conflict with prevailing acceptable views 
(32) 
Orthodoxy is not easy to attain, and to do so one must demolish the 
credibility of competing positions. The seven General Councils stand as 
witnesses to the struggle for ''right doctrine" and an end to heresy. 
Invasive dreams are not unduly worried about defective observations on 
the hypostatic union and like technicalities; they are spontaneous and 
inspirational. Any organisation with the secular responsibilities of 
the mediaeval Church could not be tolerant of competing revelations. 
The early Fathers held divergent views (33), by the time of the 
Gregorian reforms.dreams were officially seen as works of wickedness 
(34). Popular practice, one assumes, continued to use semi-pagan 
oneiromantic skills inherited from time immemorial, but only the dreams 
of the saints were approved for public instruction (35). 
As the Church achieved a more comfortable and unquestioned leadership, 
forbidden areas once again became open to study. Le Goff holds that the 
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twelfth century "reconquered" the dream for rational study. The neutral 
dream (somnium) became a valid area of study under the recognised 
discourses of medicine, physiology, and theology (36). 
But even cursory analysis of the work of two theological giants confirms 
that the crux of the matter remained unsolved. Augustine, generally 
hostile to dreams, allows the visio intellectualis credence (37), 
S.Thomas gives four types of dream, some of the body and others of the 
soul, but discourages divination (38). In other words, some dreams were 
from God, but only He knew which they were. 
The point is that the world of dreams seemed "so beautiful, so various, 
so new", so full of the promise of meaning, that it seemed to offer an 
Archimedian point of objective truth from which to judge the bewildering 
world. That it should itself be only an anarchy "where ignorant armies 
clash by night" denied the human "will-to-truth". 
THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY -
WORD AND FLESH 
Dreams might only become meaningful if they were "signs" in themselves, 
natural signs, produced in the mind and signifying a reality consonant 
with the Truth. Therefore what could be said of words, in sign theory, 
could be predicated also of dreams. For the purposes of analysis they 
were signifying entities which might or might not be bearers of truth, 
depending on their source or use to which they were put. 
Knowledge of any kind, in the orthodox Mediaeval paradigm, presupposes 
the primacy of being over knowing. In other words, the true creation 
exists in its fullness before it is apprehended and understood. Hence, 
epistemology is almost a subordinate function of metaphysics, for the 
final object of knowledge is God himself, in whom all is contained. 
To mediate between the ineffable and final source of wisdom and fallible 
understanding, an intermediary, translating agent was required. Words 
performed this function, taking things, labelling them, and allowing the 
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mind to abstract logically about the real world. A real and valid 
relationship between words and things was taken as fundamental to this 
conception. Dreams could only be signs if they were part of the divine 
order where signifiers were naturally wedded to signifieds, an 
intimation from the world of absolute truth. 
The theoretical basis of this realism was the doctrine of the 
Incarnation. When Christ became Man, he embodied the eternal truth of 
the Father, translating the spiritual into speech and action and 
standing as guarantor of the ability of words to reveal truth. The 
logos mysticism of S.John showed that the ascent to truth began with the 
word and ended in the concept the word conveyed: 
" ... we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only 
begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." 
John, I, 14 
S.Augustine develops this conception at length in a number of his works. 
Signs for him are ways to a truth beyond adequate signification, but 
which are nevertheless essential to understanding. Through the 
incarnate word, the flatus vocjs of a spoken word became meaningful -
vox sjgnjfjcans rem. All truth, all true significations, therefore, 
came into being through the operation of the true being of God in 
Christ. Interpretation of signs was necessary, of course, but one could 
rely on the guidance of the Spirit of God in explicating the word of 
God. If now one saw per speculum jn aenjgmate, one would at length see 
in the same medium as the creator, and the enigmatic figures of speech 
which constituted creation would no longer impede the vision. 
Aquinas defends an essentially similar position. The whole universe he 
takes as a sjgna de;. As one learns about the creation through the 
senses, the data become signs and then intelligible signs or verba 
ment;s. Things themselves stand as the criteria of truth, and by naming 
them one may learn their mode of being. Again, being is the foundation 
for truth, and God is the ground of being. To reach the truth one took 
the existence of God as given, and advanced "fjdes quaerens fotellectum" 
(39). 
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The illuminative search for truth set theology on the quest for true 
words and "sincere" discourse. Included among Bishop Tempier's 
condemnations of 1277 was the rejection of what was called the "standard 
of double truth" (ie, saying something to be true according to, for 
example, Aristotle, although not true by the yardstick of revelation). 
The inclusion of this proposition showed the tension between the demands 
of Orthodoxy and exploratory philosophy which culminated in the 
"fideism" of the nominalists. Ockham, to take a prominent example, 
separated the sphere of provable things from the realm of Faith. While 
empirical knowledge had to be learned by experience, faith was a self-
validating construct. One believed simply because one believed. 
Revelation was the way in which an omnipotent God chose to disclose 
himself, and the only way he could be approached or understood (40). 
The linguistic implications of this philosophy unsettled the consensus 
of Augustinian and Thomistic epistemology. Instead of the gradual 
abstraction from the real to the significant by a path of linguistic 
universals, the nominalists insisted on the arbitrary nature of the 
sign, holding that "universals" had no intrinsic reality, and existed 
simply as convenient landmarks in the mental landscape. Faith, not 
language became the path to truth, casting language out to the vagaries 
of an imperfectly observed natural world. In the age of Chaucer, 
language could not make claims to truth unchallenged any more than 
dreams could claim the power of revelation. 
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PttYSICAL MODEL OF MEDIAEVAL EPISTEMOLOGY. 
'IMA6'f~AT\ON 
, 
Pf RC£ rn o N s 
POLYCRATICUS: THE DREAM AS SIGN 
" ... But know that in the Soule 
Are many lesser Faculties that serve 
Reason as chief; among these Fansie next 
Her office holds; of all external things, 
Which the five watchful Senses represent, 
She forms Imaginations, Aerie shapes, 
Which Reason joining or disjoining, frames 
All what we affirm or what deny, and call 
Our knowledge or opinion; then retires 
Into her privat Cell when Nature rests. 
Oft in her absence mimic Fansie wakes 
To imitate her; but misjoining shapes, 
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Wilde work produces oft, and most in dreams, 
Ill matching words and deeds ... 11 
(Paradjse Lost, V, 100-112) 
One of the most self-contradictory discussions in the scholarly 
literature of the Middle Ages is John of Salisbury's account of the 
status and uses of dreams. On the one hand, he cannot deny that dreams 
may bear significance, because the infallible founding text of his 
religion is quite clear that such dreams have been vouchsafed to 
selected and inspired people. On the other hand, the recognition of the 
dream as site of real knowledge allows a disturbingly random element 
into epistemology which unsettles reason and traditional authorities. 
His perplexed argument is centered on the way in which dreams subvert 
the nature of signs. Signs, he says, are superior to the reality they 
represent. Subordinate objects may be seen to bear resemblances to 
other entities of higher importance and be used as signs of those 
things. So, for example, a boat may be a 11 sign 11 of the Church, as 
analogy with the vessel explains conveniently certain characteristics of 
the community of faith. The unexpressed analogy is with textual sudies 
of the Scriptures, where all signs were effectually subordinated to the 
supreme sign of Christ, and pointed to him and his saving work in 
typology, analogy, and allegory. 
Reading the signs in dreams, however, is a an unreliable activity 
because the hierarchy of significances cannot be firmly established (in 
other words, one can never know quite what represents what). Dream 
guides he considers unreliable and far-fetched for the fact that they 
will not submit themselves to "authority" - what appears in dreams may 
have manifold or restricted meaning, signify itself or something else, 
resemble another dream or be entirely original. Despite a certain 
emba(assment at the divination evidently used by Daniel and Moses, he 
insists on the orthodox line: whatever the vagaries of the Holy Spirit, 
" ... it is no art, or at best a meaningless one.For 
whoever involves himself in the deception of dreams is 
not sufficiently awake to the law of God, suffers a 
loss of faith, and drowses to his own ruin ... This 
whole matter really needs no further consideration 
since the whole tradition of this activity is 
foolish .. " 
(Polycraticus II, 97 & 98) 
The burden of the second book of the Polycraticus is that Nature in 
itself does not provide Truth, nor does the innocent observation of 
Nature without the framework of Faith. All the "signs" of Nature are 
the communications of God, and show what he desires to show, not what 
human beings deduce from observation. Accurate and genuine knowledge is 
the result of proper perception - "unless a man is born again he cannot 
see". What was necessary was that the doors of perception be correctly 
set, so that the reason could make true deductions and memory store 
those in increasingly whole and enlightened stores. 
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Mediaeval psychology posited three essential actions in the intellectual 
process: reception of data in perception, abstraction and logical 
ordering of these by reason, and the powerful and mysterious work of 
memory in storing the worked intellection in great patterns of 
interlocking recollection (41). The part of the intellect concerned 
with perception was the ingenium, an area which performed not only the 
mechanical functions of information gathering, but combined and prepared 
data, ordering the world correctly for the mind it served. 
The ingenium had the functions of what we term the "imagination", and 
could form images in the mind without external stimulus, using stores of 
images which had been previously garnered. The ingenium as a function 
of the mind distinct from reason was the basis for a "poetics of the 
imagination", one which took as its medium that moment when the 
imagination had the most untra?nelled power over the whole mind, that is, 
~ 
the dream. 
DE NUPTIIS PHILOLOGIAE ET MERCURI! 
We have already seen that the dream was an unstable form of experience 
(Lynch calls it "liminal''). Descriptions of supposed dreams could 
consequently v~nture on imaginative territory which transgressed the 
boundaries of convention, or told of places and experiences not 
accessible to man in his natural state. As it seemed that pure 
philosophy could not adequately solve the problematic dialectic between 
Faith and Reason, poets volunteered their skills to marry thought and 
expression. 
The ''symbolist" theory of reality held by Aquinas proposed a vast chain 
of analogies by which the material could approach the divine. Seeing 
the way in which the created order showed and symbolized the higher 
order resembled interpreting the literary techniques of allegory, 
fabula, involucra, and integumentum by which a poet could veil his 
message in words. So, understanding the world was to read its concealed 
meanings correctly, abstracting from appearances to invisible areas of 
truth. Dream poetry was an attempt for the pure creative imagination to 
read the riddles of the world and to expound them in new wholes. 
Just as the phi and omega on the robes of Boethius' Lady Philosophy 
showed a visionary attempt to meld praxis and theory, and the Nature of 
Alain de Lille's De Planctu Naturae is known through both genius and 
ingenium, the writers of literary dreams were exploring the place of the 
mind in the world, often attempting to explain the relation of the 
imagination and the perception to what was ultimately real and finally 
true (42). 
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TWO KINDS OF WRITING 
The tradition of the dream poem provides two opposing models. That a 
narrative had its birth in a vision might be an earnest of its absolute 
veracity and proof positive of its sublime inspiration. It might 
alternatively imply that it was the product of random and possibly 
malign forces, and to be treated with considerable reserve and caution. 
So too, in exploring the workings of the mind, poets could either 
emphasize the liberating and illuminating effects of the dream and 
extrapolate from that into a model of epistemology which showed the 
approach of the mind to truth, or, alternatively, they might use the 
darkness and confusion of the dream to demonstrate the difficulties of 
attaining truth, and the many barriers in the process of gaining wisdom. 
Of the many paradigm texts available to Chaucer, the two of greatest 
moment were the Roman de la Rose of Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun 
and Dante's Commedia Divina. The pair form precise opposites 
in terms of the modes in which they are expressed, the tenor of their 
expression, and the nature of their subject matter. Dante's vision is a 
sublime summation of the philosophical achievement of an age, which is 
made absolute when located in an apparition of eternity. The Roman is 
partly an elegant allegory of Love, and partly a roller-coaster ride 
through a carnival of conflicting Mediaeval voices, brought together in 
the imaginings of a mind stimulated by desire. The House of Fame cannot 
escape this commanding pair of texts, and is forced to make something of 
them. Precisely what is a question more illuminating than one might 
suppose. 
In the nineteenth century, considerable scholarly op1n1ons designated 
the Divine Comedy as Chaucer's model. Ten Brink in 1870 published his 
Studien detailing common points shared by the texts, and this study was 
followed by another in 1880, which noted further similarities, by 
Rambeau . The case rested firstly on general resemblances. Each poem 
is a vision in three parts, each has a dream guide and each heads for a 
place of heavenly revelation. Secondly, they exhibit such common 
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features of subject matter as the use of Virgil's Aeneid and 
discussions of natural phenomena in scientific terms - Dante; 
Gravitation, and Chaucer; sound. Thirdly, detailed comparisons were 
made - the use of "invocations", the eagle's derivation from the Comedy, 
common comparisons with the vision of St Paul,and particulars of 
descriptions used for the respective groups of people - Chaucer's 
minstrels and Dante's redeemed souls, for example. The point of finding 
these affinities was to show that the House of Fame was, in conception, 
primarily a parody of Dante's poem (43). 
W.O. Sypherd, in 190 , dealt summarily with these resemblances (44). 
While not doubting Chaucer's general debt to Dante or challenging clear 
echoes of his work (such as the Invocation of Thought (523-8) which is 
based on Inferno II, 8/9 and Paradiso I, 11) Sypherd dismisses the 
case. The general resemblances, he asserts, while certainly detectable, 
are common to a large number of vision poems,and in any case, shared 
subject matter may be explained as the predictable product of a common 
literary domain. Resemblances of specific points are either trivial, of 
a shared cultural heritage or subsumed, as borrowings, into a different 
kind of literary work. Nor is the work a parody of the Divine Comedy, 
specifically, for it does not work closely enough against its model for 
parody to be recognisable. Sypherd convincingly demolishes a simplistic 
reading of the poem as pure caricature, but fails to see the literary 
importance of the concept of satirical imitation. In writing 
differently from Dante, Chaucer is aligning himself with an inimical and 
contrary ideology of textuality, an act which locates his poem in an 
ancient debate. 
The importance of reopening Syp\rd's case is that such a casual 
~ 
dismissal of conceptual influences would make the poem deceptively easy 
of access and interpretation - something which it is obviously not. 
More significantly, debating whether or not the House of Fame is a 
simple parody of Dante is a false trail which obscures the deeper 
disagreements which divide the respective literary conceptions of the 
Italian and his English admirer. 
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PRAESTAT FIDES SUPPLEMENTUM 
SENSUUM DEFECTUI 
The Commedia Divina is an influence that cannot be avoided. It is the 
supreme example of a dream vision which appropriates authority to 
itself, claiming for the mind, and especially the imagination and tbe 
memory, powers of almost supernatural discernment. Dante's vision is a 
"vision of authority" insofar as it is replete with guides and 
revelations. But, as Gabriel Josipovici describes, what makes the 
Divine Comedy sublimely convincing is the way it "represents" what Dante 
sees (45). It employs venerable conventions; personification allegory 
is used, the narrator lays claim to the credence granted to eye 
witnesses. But Dante transcends these. In his account, the reader 
seems to be taken beyond the need for mediated discourse into a private 
epiphany of the text. Dante's "realism" attempts to be a sacramental 
reflexion of creation, which strains against the bounds of the 
interposing text and interpretative process and masquerades as 
transcendent reality, sublimely and uniquely present. Dante turns the 
workings of the mind in a visionary mode into a symbol of the way the 
cosmos is structured in the mind of God. 
In The Allegory of Love, C.S. Lewis makes a distinction between what he 
calls the "allegorical" and the "symbolic" modes (46). Allegory, in the 
manner of metaphor, takes the apprehensible data of the material world 
and uses them to express the immaterial experiences of the mind, but a 
mind which is everywhere bounded by the real world. So an allegorical 
"person" who behaves like a visible person is given a title "Ira" or 
"Patientia" and expresses the manner in which the passion or virtue of 
that name operates; just the kind of process, in fact, which Chaucer 
employs to portray Fame. Like "Love", this is not a substance with its 
own existence, but, as Dante says "uno accidente in sustanzia", "una 
Figura o co lore rettorico" (Vita Nuova, XXV). 
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The symbolical mode takes this signifying process and changes its terms 
of reference. In it, the Allegorical mode is turned on its head and the 
materiai world is treated as if it were itself the copy or symbol system 
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of another higher immaterial world; as if the realities we see around us 
were simply the signs or words which signify other and superior 
realities. The process may be illustrated in the following ~:.!J'{_: 
11 SYMBOL 11 -
(SACRAMENTAL) 
(PSYCHOLOGICAL) 
11 ALLEGORY 11 -
expresses a superior reality which comprehends what is 
taken for "Real", in the same manner as a sacrament. 
"HIGHER" REALITIES 
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE REAL 
"LOWER" REALITIES 
expresses a subordinate reality which it represents 
by means of a code, in which the lower concepts are 
described in terms of the highest unity, the human 
self. 
The Symbolical mode is Platonic in conception and equivalent to the 
sacramental impulse, where the function of a natural element such as 
water which washes, cleanses, and revives becomes the matter of baptism 
which actually (in the preeminently ''real" spiritual order) washes, 
cleanses, and revives the soul. It is a linguistic model which aids the 
imagination in constructing ideas of things beyond ideas. It is, in 
fact, faith's mode of expression. 
The power, then, of the Commedja Ojvjna is that in it Dante 
"naturalises" the mysteries of the spiritual realm as if in a directly 
mimetic process. The persona of the Commedja is at pains to insist that 
he is merely the medium, a copyist, and not the manufacturer of what he 
sees ("quella materia ond'io son fatta scriba"). Entering Paradise, 
Dante is relieved of the curse of the Fall which rendered words 
unreliable and defective. Virgil leaves him as an unworthy interpreter 
with this solace 
"Non aspettar mio dir piu, ne mio cenno. 
Libero, dritto e sano e tuo arbitrio 
El fallo fora non fare a suo senna" 
(Purg. XXVII, 139-41) 
(Do not any longer expect my word or sign. Your judgement is now 
free, upright, and pure, it would be a fault not to act as it 
directs.) 
The reader need only look through Dante's eyes to see "The Real World", 
a supernatural order of existence. The narrative becomes sacramental 
because God, not the author, is the source of the reality which is 
described. Dante attempts to use the dream position as a privileged 
space from which his authorship will be refined out of the relations of 
the text because of his "inspiration" and replaced by that of the 
original creative word. The text aims at an utter stasis - "En la sua 
voluntade e nostra pace". The nature of the world as a book written by 
God is opened through the extinction of the writer's mediating 
personality, and divinely permeated Reality is produced. 
The Allegorical personjfjcatjon, on the other hand, deals with realities 
whose operations are unmistakable and which stem from an obviously 
material source - the brain - but which work by complex processes which 
are mysteriously hidden. A human "character" is the best fictional copy 
of such processes; what one might call an "anthropomorphic model". It 
deals similarly with intricate social relationships ("falling in love") 
or social/historical processes ("Fame" or "Fortune") in the same 
humanised and dramatic scale. It is a shorthand expression, as it were, 
of what is partially understood, but difficult to represent. As a mode, 
it is essentially rhetorical, a trick of language used to master what is 
acknowledged to be subordinate, human and material. 
The difference between Dante's endeavour and that of Chaucer in the 
House of Fame could scarcely be more profound. Rather than producing a 
text which would be a transparent window on the world and mediate 
Truth, Chaucer, seeing "through a glass, darkly", produces discourse 
which is impenPt.rr1blP: constantly aware of it.s firt.ionr1l nr1ti1re and 
status as one text among many, entangled in the material and 
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unpredictable fate which texts must suffer in the historical world of 
the Lady Fame. This is, indirectly, a parody of Dante, who situates 
himself in the other worlds of Heaven and Hell because they are places 
where the confusions and deceitful representations of this world are 
finally dispelled. Chaucer's alternative world is a more muddled 
extension of the temporal one. More importantly, it is the product of 
another tradition of writing altogether, one which avoids the claim of 
final authority made by Dante (that the world is "really like this") and 
rather explores its own nature as text and demonstrates that writing is 
"like this'' and that its realities are representations. 
DEFLOWERING THE ROSE 
Rather than extending the imaginary vision outward to a supernatural 
world which the mind may visit, the French Love Vision, which 
culiminates in the Roman, focuses on the inward self at a moment when 
that self is in the throes of destabilisation. Rather than the 
supremely confident epic self, we encounter the "romance'' self, a 
fictional persona who is being defined and explained by the plot as 
if he were a text under critical scrutiny. Especially familiar to 
English readers (from Malory) is the achievement of Chretien de Troyes. 
In Chretien's Arthurian adventures, the action of the questing knights 
is largely an excuse for psychological introspection, and where Chretien 
ventures into the mind, he does so allegorically (47). This kind of 
thing is retained by Malory (much watered-down) especially in his 
treatment of the Grail Qu~st - a quest is a less self confident and more 
~~~ 
introspective mode thanA founding - and in episodes such as Percival's 
experience of killing a lion and serpent and dreaming of women riding on 
identical beasts. Later, he is told that they symbolized the Church and 
the Law respectively, in battle for his soul. Bors too has adventures 
with "lust" in the form of women who attempt seduction, but vanish when 
he makes the sign of the cross (48). 
Love, not surprisingly, occupies a prominent place in this literature. 
Irrational and complex psychology lures the allegorizers to exercise 
their psychoanalytic skills, and the process of making a love contract 
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reveals a good deal of the elaborate processes of desire, self 
deception, craft and, especially, divisions within the self which are 
the very stuff of such analyses. (Catullus' "odi et amo" shows this 
type of conflict precisely, as does Dante's description of the effects 
of the siren on a mind excited to lust by the beauty of a song.). 
Because of this, Love is perfectly suited to the allegorized literary 
mode, in which the mental landscape of romantic encounters may be 
personified and given independent life. 
"The gaze turned inward with a moral purpose does not discover 
character. No man is a "character" to himself and least cf all 
when he thinks of good or evil ... The unitary "soul" or 
"personality'' which interests the novelist is for him merely the 
arena in which the combat ants meet." (49) 
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Lewis speaks specifically here about the Psychomachia of Prudentius and 
its tradition, but the principle (as he later shows) holds good for all 
psychological explorations in the mode. Love simply concentrates the 
mind on a singular object with particular power, and the internal 
conflicts which result are not "abstractions", but real encounters with 
parts of the psyche that seem to have assumed autonomous powers, and 
which dislodge reality. An encounter with the "other" in the form of a 
love-partner arouses unknown tracts of the unconscious mind which 
register in emotions and desires in conflict with reason and habit. The 
lover in the Rose encounters these on his way to his tryst with his 
beloved, and discards them as the plot tends gradually towards 
seduction. Amans is always within the framework of the mind, however, 
and makes no "ascent" or escape in his journey. Compare this with 
Dante's infatuation. Beatrice inspires him to reunify his model of the 
cosmos with Love as the central force and the Mother of God as its chief 
ornament, "sublimation" ending in the sublime. 
The Roman de la Rose precedes the Commedia. Its conception is rooted in 
psychic fragmentation , and it is essentially introspective. At a 
crucial point in Guillaume de Lorris' text, the Lover discovers the very 
fountain at which Narcisscus died, rapt in the prospect of his own 
rP.flexion. Looking into it. he sees two crystal stones which reflect 
the garden. Closer inspection reveals the roses and, among them, an 
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unopened bud for which he at once feels a strange desire. This sudden 
and transforming experience, so reminiscent of Stendhal, deftly evokes 
the subjective tyranny of being in love. The crystals of the stream 
are, by their nature, reflexive,and in fact the Dreamer sees only 
himself, his own eyes and the unyielding surfaces of water and stone. 
He may see obliquely off the reflexions of those surfaces as in a 
dream, "codes" allow ideas to evade the "internal censor" - but it is 
in the first instance himself he perceives, and only incidentally the 
garden which is the setting of his passion. As J.V. Fleming observes, 
"The ultimate object of Amant's love is not the 'lady', not 'love 
itself', not even some fragile and immeasurable mystery of the human 
heart ... but himself. Amant's object is seipsum" (50). 
WE THINK OF THE KEY, EACH IN HIS PRISON 
THIKING OF THE KEY ... 
:,,H 
T.S. Eliot, The Wasteland. 
"My external sensations are no less private to my self than are my 
thoughts or my feelings. In either case my experience falls 
within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with 
all its elements alike, every sphere is opaque to the others which 
surround it ... In brief, regarded as an existence which appears in 
a soul, the whole world for each is peculiar and private to that 
soul" 
F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p.306. 
We have by now come to a great divide in Western thought, and the 
positions are clearly enough establised for us to range them against one 
another in a series of dualistic oppositions. The vision of Dante and 
the dream of Amans are only two of these ancient reflexions of one 
another. 
Plato's denunciation of the Sophists is an equal set of paired 
antithesss. The philosopher argues for a stable self, not to be 
manipulated by the ploys of art, and denounces the rhetorical 
flamboyance of the sophist wordsmiths (51). Knowledge is an 
illumination of something eternal fur PlaLo, not something to be 
achieved by the bandying of mere words. At a less violent level, this 
same conflict divides the Aristotelian from the Platonist, for the 
Aristotelian is prepared to be imprisoned within a system of natural 
laws, learning only through his senses and reason, while the Platonist 
is open to a superior spiritual world, the locus of all truth. 
The homo philosophicus is in theory, a unitary self governed by general 
laws and spiritual constraints. Language is a means of storing wisdom -
a higher entity altogther than words. The homo rhetoricus is, 
alternatively, the sum of the words he produces and the self of the most 
recent speech act he has uttered. In consequence, man as lingustically 
constituted cannot occupy any place of privilege outside his own system 
of signifiers. 
The kind of language used by these two schools is also radically 
different in theory. On the one hand, language is an act of remembrance 
and illumination in which humans echo the divine. On the other it is a 
simple exercise in the variety of effects which may be achieved in an 
extremely large and complex system. 
In the late Middle Ages, as we have sketched, the Realist fusion of 
Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought was challenged by a system which 
insisted on the provisional and unverifiable nature of thought, and of 
language in particular. Augustine and Bonaventure, mediated in Aquinas 
gave way to Siger and Ockham. In literature a similarly deep divide in 
modes of expression is to be found. 
The transition from "epic to romance" in the literary history of the 
Middle Age,could perhaps have given impetus to the analysis of this 
dichotomy. The epic is a text of the establishment, literally and 
figuratively. It is a discourse of power and used as such to identify a 
people and exalt a hero at some primal historical or mythological 
moment, looking out of its text to a greater reality. Romances, on the 
other hand, thrive on the matter of lovers defying Fate, circumstance 
and tyranny in order to express their personal destinies and desires. 
Their tales end conclusively within the frameworks of their texts and 
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claim no allegiance from their hearers apart from emotional 
identification. 
In the Latin tradition, Virgil and Ovid oppose one another as epic bard 
and love lyricist~ I have chosen Dante and the Rose poets as Mediaeval 
examples of the modes of sacramental and psychological writing. Chaucer 
is, I think, one of the Ovidian writers. He establishes a particular 
space for language, where all other demands are subordinated to the 
intrinsic fictionality of a specific speech event. In the House of Fame 
this conception of language as a way of knowing and being is developed 
with extraordinary complexity. 
In situating the mind within a dream, Chaucer reduces its work to that 
which is already sealed off within itself. In oher words, everything is 
reduced to words, the code by which the brain simplifies and stores all 
data. Then, systematically, he leads us through an examination of how 
the brain functions according to contemporary models, showing at each 
stage the pitfalls of that particular mode of intellection. All this is 
contained in the extended metaphor of literature and language, which 
stands for all possible knowledge. 
As an act of self-analysis, the dream of the tenth of December is a 
ruthless, if comic, delineation of the human predicament. Locked into 
the prison house of the body, ensnared by language, even the illusions 
we have of flight are thrust down like the over-ambitious Icarus. Fame 
has only partridge's wings (HoF, 1391-2), like those of the humble and 
earthbound Perdix (Metamorphoses, VIII 236-59) and cannot rise above the 
mortal sphere. 
The point of the three books of the House of Fame is to take us through 
a complete act of thought, following the traditional threefold model. 
In the first book, the dominant mode of apprehension is sight, a sense 
traditionally associated with desire and the eye of the imagination. 
Both of these are functions of the ingenium, the first epistemological 
process, here the claims of pseudo-romantic poetic theory to knowledge 
of a higher order are thoroughly de-bunked in the disastrous and 
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deceptive love of Dido and Aeneas, and in the the interpretative work of 
the narrator persona. The second book is dominated by sound, the mode 
of reasonable understanding and teaching. Here, the teacher and hearer 
fail to complete their didactic contract, and the Nature they attempt to 
understand seems to be a hopeless muddle of the real and the fanciful -
Reason is not the irresistible tool it claims to be. Finally, the third 
book takes us to the place where memory is stored, and this proves to be 
the most chaotic of all. Far from resembling the chain of being in the 
mind of God (like the Paradiso) this world which the dreamer 
vicariously experiences is a chaos of language which has escaped from 
all the constraints of the conscious and controlling mind. Worst of 
all, for those who hope for redemption from chaos, even those hints we 
have of a mystical ascent to truth are rebuffed, language cannot even 
carry us to the God whose own words made us and by which man lives, and 
not by bread alone. 
ELVYSSH BY HIS CONTENAUNCE 
First among the decentring techniques Chaucer employs is to unsettle a 
stable sense of the unitary consciousness. This is achieved by 
permeating with irony the narratorial voice of his persona. Readers of 
the Canterbury Tales will recall the bumbling storyteller whom Chaucer 
uses as his persona in that work which is a dazzling tour de force of 
narrative art. Similarly, in this work which is a shrewd exposition of 
the convolutions of reading and writing, the persona is a man befuddled 
by reading, described by the eagle as a hard working servant of Venus 
who continually strives to create love stories and devours romances 
" Tyl fully das,..,ed ys thy look" (HoF, 658) 
Despite this effort, he has never had the characters of his fantasy life 
reply to or recognize his devotion. As the unaided action of fictional 
characters is quite simply beyond the bounds of possibility, the reader 
must make the adjustment that it is into a high fictional world that the 
dreaming Chaucer enters through the door of sleep, much like the 
Wonderland Al ice Jicuver~ down a we1"i or throu911 c1 1uui<..i11y-y1d~~. 
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Although we abandon the canons of reality in this realm, the attitudes 
of Realism remain in the highly ironic ghost voice of the meta-narrator. 
The intervening persona "Geffry" divides the living man from the 
literary man - self from self - in recognition of the rupture between 
being and representation. Although lightly expressed, the division is a 
profound attempt at revealing one of the paradoxes of language and a 
basic premise of Fiction. Viewed seriously, the text obliges one to 
abandon the habitual assumption that one's own unique perception of the 
world is the world. The joke on the eagle is that he is so bombastic 
and prolix that he never pauses to discover that even his own discourse 
is provisional, at the same time as he overbearingly displaces Geffry's 
voice, reducing him to a punctuating "Noo? why?" or "Nay". His pointed 
remarks on Geffry's stoutness - "Thou art noyous to carye" - are plainly 
references to Chaucer himself, which includes him in the programme of 
ironies as yet another replaceable "character". 
The narrator-persona has chosen the company of books rather than people 
and is now condemned to live out that fantasy in the world of books as 
reward, but he experiences fiction where it most obviously impinges on 
the real world, that is in the matter of Fame. Fame is a distillation 
of all the ways in which speaking beings project themselves, using 
language, for the purposes of love or reputation or amusement or 
identity. Historical events exist in sealed units of Fame used like 
bullets in a "war of the words". 
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The dream forms an elegant way to express this division between the 
irreducible spaces of signifiers and signifieds. In the dream, all the 
traditional literary devices - like the ekphrasjs, guide-interpreter, 
use of personification allegory, and significant landscape become 
temporarily real, the very landscape of the fiction, while the character 
"Chaucer" as a thinking subject becomes temporarily fictional. All of 
this inversion is enclosed in the meta-narrator's level of discourse, 
felt at the level of ironic interruption. 
Philosopically, the use of the unreliable persona expresses a kind of 
secular tolerance. Chaucer is not an unbeliever or a cynic, 
necessarily, but, as we have noted, he takes seriously the concept of a 
Fall which has flawed all communication. Human intercourse flounders in 
lack of mutual understanding because of this intrinsic failing, and at 
times even needs the aid of fiction to make its meaning clear. The 
obtuse persona in the Book of the Duchess misunderstands the knight's 
lament for the loss of his queen because he cannot understand the terms 
of the basic metaphor the dream-vision employs. In the Duchess, the 
conceit actually becomes the terms of the "real", just as the chess 
board is the real landscape in Alice Through The Looking-Glass. 
Dramatic tension comes from the reader's realisation of the literary 
equation while the actor in the story still blunders around seeking a 
map of what his situation is . Similarly, "Geffry" in the House of Fame 
is unaware of the terms on which he is in the vision. Is he Enoch or 
Elias, snatched up by God? Romulus or Ganymede in a classical 
extravaganza? Paul or John in the throes of a supernatural revelation? 
These self-important conjecturings are neatly punctured both by the 
eagle's disrespect and by the reader's sense of the ridiculous. Geffry 
is the dupe of his creator, whose eye for comic deflation catches the 
least opportunity. 
The first dream encounter with the temple of glass emphasises the levels 
of fiction at work in the conception. Geffry encounters the formative 
epic moment (as seen by the Middle Ages) in Virgil's work. Rather than 
seeing a series of events, or being transposed back to that fictional 
moment where it all "happened", the story is shown at another level of 
artificiality: it is painted on the walls of the elaborately crafted 
shrine, and introduced by a brass tablet inscribed with the opening 
words of the Aeneid. This allows us to see the demolition of the epic 
impulse as Geffry reads and "deconstructs" the presuppositions of the 
text, and we watch his interpretative, selective mind at work. 
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What transpires in the telling of Book 1 is the collation of a series of 
separations into a single narrative. The plot on the panels is the work 
of Virgil, modified by Ovid and reshuffled according to notions of 
Mediaeval propriety into the ordo naturalis (53). In this form it runs 
fairly smoothly as a record of Geffry's impressions: prolix where he 
becomes personally stirred by the turn of events and terse when he is 
abridging what he simply scans. The different "speeds" of this perusal 
are more than incidental. They are the evocation of a more subtle theme 
in this section as a representation of the actual process of reading as 
it happens. "Reading" is the essential link in all the textual layers of 
this palimpsestic passage, and it is seen to be a product of desire 
through the practice of the Geffry persona. 
The interpretative spiral begins with the core story, that of Dido and 
Aeneas, which is assumed to have been "real". In the plot structure 
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which the story assumes, all the action springs from a misreading. Dido 
reads Aeneas according to a private discourse of desire, in which the 
Trojan is the princely lover of whom the queen has always dreamed. 
Conversely, his script is written by the god Mercury and does not 
include this entanglement. When the actions of Aeneas show absolutely 
bluntly that he is not the character of her fantasies, Dido "writes 
herself out" of the story and effectively ends her role by killing 
herself. 
The next layer is that of Virgil's textual stratagems, which are 
critically read by Ovid in the Heroides. The Ovidian act of reading 
refuses to accept the whitewashing heroic convention of the epic form 
and replaces it with the more "dialogical" romance. Instead of the 
overarching concern of the founding of a great city, Ovid insists on the 
smaller scale of personal desires and private betrayals. A gulf of 
difference divides the Virgilian ur-text from the Ovidian reader. It is 
only in the re-connecting discourse of a third narrative that they can 
be harmonised, or at least intertwined. 
It seems that an anonymous painter has read both views of the story and 
transposed them into a single string of frescoes, perhaps depicting the 
heart-wrenching events at Carthage in higher colours. Certainly this is 
a new work, an interpretation and reperformance of the "matter of Rome" 
and this fact stresses again the fictiveness of the self-reflexive glass 
temple, in the Mediaeval equivalent of a big-screen adaptation. Having 
no doubt read the book, the persona Geffry enters and sees the pictures. 
His reading expresses both possible lines of interpretation 
dialogically, and although it seems clear that his emotional sympathies 
lie with Dido, Aeneas' singular sense 
mitigation ("But to excusen Eneas"). 
have access to his critical comments 
of destiny is given a hearing in 
We see both Geffry's reading and 
'"A, Lord!"thoughte I, "that madest us, 
Yet sawgh I never such noblesse 
Of ymages .. . "'(Hof, 470-72) 
So moved is he that he composes a diatribe and lament for the jilted 
queen to deliver in his own words "Non other auctor alegge I'' (Hof, 
314). Needless to say it is a highly influenced piece, which contrasts 
pointedly with Aeneas' own detachment when he encounters the 
representation of his own story (Aenejd, I.453ff). 
A distinction is implied between the God who made us and the unknown 
craftsman who created the "chirche" from which Geffry has emerged, a 
reminder that the temple is not natural and "only a story". Geffry is, 
however, slow to grasp the "nature" of his predicament and cannot make 
the perceptual leap required to orientate himself in the hall of 
mirrors. As he is not in the world of Nature, he will not see 
" ... no manner creature 
That ys yformed be Nature 
... me to rede or wisse." (Hof, 489-91) 
Only the unreal flora and fauna of the Imaginary world exist in this 
unreal, deserted landscape, and even the eagle which hovers in the sky 
above is as much a compact literary allusion as a character. The poor 
Geffry's heartfelt prayer: 
"'O Crist!' thoughte I, 'that art in blysse, 
Fro fantome and illusion 
Me save ... '" (Hof, 492-4) 
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could hardly be less apposite, for Geffry is in the toils of a phantom 
already and soon to be in the claws of another. The mythological Jove 
is the motivating deity in these parts, and his decrees determine the 
subsequent events. The God of the real world is without competence in 
the framed space of Fame and would scarcely deign to rescue a caricature 
l i ke Gef fry. 
Geffry's inept efforts at reading a semiotic field are being read in 
their turn by the author of the story, and his critical stance is 
sceptical irony. Chaucer defies identification with his simulacrum, a 
man who will not look at the stars because he is quite happy to trust 
the opinions of those who "write of this matere" (HoF, 1013), even 
though the stars in this cosmos are the mythical bodies of stellified 
beasts and heroes. 
The last process of understanding will be the reader's. It is not 
entirely an independent one, especially if the text be orally presented, 
for the mechanism of irony is to contrive a particular response from the 
ideal audience, insisting that it create an ideal text by comparison 
with which the actual opinions of the actual text are inadequate. 
Interpretation of this slightly more rigorous kind hammers home the 
point once again, that all the texts of this section of the poem are 
provisional and open to many re-tellings and re-readings. All 
experiences of dreams remind us of this, as we strive to remember what 
our selves "did" in the story, and have to assess our parts in an 
unconscious fiction, reviewing a genuine but provisional reality. In 
the process, the unreality of the account as against the event shows 
that language and its crude tools~~ a poor replacement for the 
visionary moment, now vanished forever. 
The essence of this Book is the oblique assertion that the whole world 
of fiction is equally contingent and, despite Geffry's angst, Chaucer 
will proceed to delight in the pleasures of a kingdom where all 
judgements, appearances, terrors, and delights are strictly temporary 
and displaceable and everything may be exploded simply by waking up. 
The sharper one's sense of what is fictional, the more clearly one will 
recognise the borders of the limited world we are prepared to recognise, 
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and imagine what lies beyond it, in the mystery of how things are not. 
In the other concerns of this poem, Chaucer explores just how much of 
the world - as his contemporaries saw and read it - is ''fictional", 
being constructed out of conventions, representations, literary 
tradition and the fantasies of desire and self-importance. The House of 
Fame is a grand semiotic romp through the hallowed portals of 
conventional ways of seeing which calls the bluff of seriousness in the 
name of comic irony. 
I propose to deal with this "deconstructive" enterprise sectionally, 
following the traditional editorial divisions of the text into books. 
Each book is ruled by a "goddess'' figure, whose sphere of fictional 
power is teased apart and examined. Love, Nature, and Fame should each, 
ideally, be accompanied by extensive explanatory introductions, tracing 
the construction of their particular complex of ideas or ideology, but 
this the exigencies of space will not permit. The dream encapsulates a 
sceptical and strictly provisional reading of the epistemologies of 
affection, man's place in the natural world, and the world of language, 
taking in along its course a quizzical look at the claims of Science and 
the operations of Literature. ''Only disconnect", Chaucer seems to 
insist, and one will be astounded at what unravels. 
TO CARTHAGE THEN I CAME 
The glass temple which is Geffry's first destination is soon 
recognizable as a shrine to Venus. The goddess is emblazoned on the 
walls in iconographical pose ''rising from the waves", surrounded by 
doves and attended by her son, Cupid, and husband, Vulcan. The 
blindness of the one and the ugliness of the other are allegorical 
expressions of Venus' qualities of randomness and incongruity. Cupid's 
arrows signify the absolutely arbitrary workings of desire and the 
incongruous match with Vulcan, crippled, hideous, and probably impotent, 
shows the absurd couplings that result. Although it is not unfitting 
that Venus should adorn the walls of her own temple, one is surprised 
to see that the other frescoes show the adventures, not of famous 
lovers, but of an epic hero. Aeneas, moreover, is not a faithful Paris 
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or an antique Casanova who devotes his life to the service of love, but 
a grim and fairly ruthless empire builder whose life's plan treats women 
as breeders or sexual conveniences. It is precisely the way of Venus to 
be the mother and patron of such a cad, keep him out of scrapes, and 
even act as his pimp when she arranges that Dido fall for him. 
Read by the Middle Ages, as here by Geffry, the Aenejd becomes a romance 
rather than an epic, and turns around the brief affajre between a royal 
couple cast up on foreign shores, alone but with kingdoms to govern, 
overcome by sudden and helpless passion. Like Havelock and Goldboru or 
Floris and Blancheflour their union becomes the engine of their plot and 
the engineer of their plight. When Aeneas leaves, he simply destroys 
the narrative, leaving Dido no decent dramatic course of action but to 
end her redundant life. 
How does this situation occur? It seems that Dido has been guilty of a 
progression of misreadings - she has presumed that she is the heroine of 
the story, even situated herself in the wrong genre altogether. The 
brittle, delicate, and reflexive temple enhances the sense of trompe 
l'oej] by which the queen has been deceived. In her desire to see 
Aeneas as lover she has constructed a being which is simply a projection 
of her imaginative powers. 
Aeneas emerges out of a racily brief saga of narrow escapes and high 
perils and is cast up on the shore of Africa where Venus is disporting 
herself, masquerading as a huntress. In no time she solves the 
predicament of his ruined fleet by despatching him off to Carthage and 
sweetening up the queen on his arrival. "Venery" disrupts the order of 
things almost at once when the pair illicitly consummate their union, 
and do "al that weddynge longeth too"(HoF, 244). 
Aeneas' method of seduction seems to lie in the power of his words. 
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Like Othello, the story of the dangers he has passed make him exotic and 
desirable. The textual nexus is laconically snide - in two successive 
images Aeneas tells of his progress (every cas / That hym was tyd upon 
the see .. . HoF, 255-6) and receives the adulation of Dido as 
"Hyr lyf, hir love, hir lust, hir lord" (HoF, 258). That he has lied is 
not explicitly stated, nor - as other critics assert - is it plain that 
Chaucer has inserted an oath of fidelity on Aeneas' part. All that is 
settled is that Dido paid him the homage which any woman might do 
"wenyng hyt had al be so/ As he hir swor ... "(HoF, 262-3). Quite what 
Aeneas swore is unspecified; it may have been that he so often protested 
his own veracity as a reporter that Dido, yearning for an oath of 
fidelity, took this as sufficient earnest of his intentions. The 
implications of the narrator's outrage are that he "as good as" promised 
marriage and then took advantage of this dangling understanding to mend 
his ships and take his pleasure, but the partisan stances of observers 
when love matches break up are scarcely material evidence. Was Aeneas 
behaving like Odysseus, and manipulating a favourable situation, or was 
he the innocent victim of an hallucinating woman? The texts do not 
allow sufficient certainty. Perhaps Aeneas, being an epic hero, is too 
"true" to be good. 
What is clear is that Dido considers herself deceived and that Geffry, 
stirred by the tale, casts himself as her champion. First he delivers a 
string of gnomic sententiae like "hyt is not al gold that glareth" (HoF, 
272) and"he that fully knoweth th'erbe / May saufly leye hyt to hy~ye" 
(HoF, 209-1). The overt point of these is to establish that it is the 
common wisdom that "men were deceivers ever", that they use words to 
lure the objects of their desire and when that is dissipated, slander 
them as "unkynde, fals, privy or double", and with words dispose of 
them. Can it be that Chaucer too intends such a simple interpretative 
equation? The fusion of "trouthe" in verbal praxis and as an attitude 
of soul, familiar to readers of the Franklin's Tale, is applied to 
Aeneas who "wolde hir of trouthe fayle" (HoF, 297). Remembering 
Virgil's constant epithet "pius" for his hero, which translates well 
into a similar semantic field as this use of "true'', Aeneas here stands 
accused of destroying his own nature. By allowing misrepresentation to 
exist, even through complicity with Dido's self-deception, Aeneas opens 
the way for an infinite uncertainty of readings which will in turn 
compromise Dido, and which ill befit the representation of a founding 
father. 
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WHAT SHULDE I SPEKE MORE QUEYNTE, 
OR PEYNE ME MY WORDES PEYNTE 
TO SPEKE OF LOVE? HYT WOL NOT BE; 
I KAN NOT OF THAT FACULTE. 
Women's truth rests less upon the spoken word than on the truth of their 
bodies: a "true" woman is a chaste one. The patriarchal set of power 
relations forceswomen into subordinate positions, from which they can 
only escape by the use of evasive and subversive tactics. Women's 
craft, as described in the Merchant's Tale, characteristically employs 
lies and prevarication, and by implication, all feminine discourse is 
suspect to men. To be true, a woman must preserve her chastity or be 
martyred in order to purge herself of any taint of misrepresentation. 
After having been made false by Aeneas, appearing to be a wife without 
actually placing the relationship under the constraints of law, Dido 
ceases to be true and is no longer fit to exercise her role as the law 
maker in Carthage. The law expects a perfect consonance of word and 
deed in a stable convention of representation, "sincerity" as it is 
abbreviated. Her word can hardly be law when she patently cannot 
enforce it on her man or obey it herself. In her defence, she is 
obliged to construct a legitimating lament in which she reveals Aeneas 
as the stereotypical philanderer, just like all other men, in order to 
exculpate herself. He is converted from a wholly individual and 
captivating subject in her first discourse of desire to an example of a 
type; simply one villain among many, in the discourse of dissociation 
which follows. A few examples suffice to give the tone of the 
monologue: 
"O, have ye men such godlyhede 
In speche, and never a del of trouthe? .. . 
. .. We wrechched wymmen konne noon art .. . 
.. . Thus be we served everychone ... 
... For though your love laste a seson 
Wayte upon the conclusyon ... "(HoF, 330-1,335,337,341-2) 
Turning her personal grief into an impersonal set of verities is Dido's 
last attempt to wi~ the tcxtLl~l h""l++l,... ... .;+h I\'"'"""'<" LIU'-'\., I \.. f1 I Lo 11 r\\..11 \.. U. J • 
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she vents will endure beyond her single tragedy in women's lore, and she 
seals it in the way traditional to the helpless female victim - by dying 
as the proof of her sincerity. Her complaint enters into a stream of 
like texts, and in the examples given by Geffry of famous jilts -
"Breseyda, Oenone, Dyanira" and others we are shown another, feminised 
literature. The subversive feminine strain finds a promoter in the 
person of Ovid. 
The Amores and more particularly the Heroides of Ovid are deliberately 
in counterpoint to the masculinist epic and heroic tradition. As Virgil 
does, Ovid sees love as a metonymy for the irrational impulses of the 
human mind. Unlike the epic bard, he is sceptical as to whether 
irrationalism may be controlled by reason or sublimated in the pursuit 
of duty. When Ovid attempts to write in the epic mode, he finds that 
his views of the world preclude such an endeavour - in allegory, Cupid 
wickedly steals the last foot of the heroic line: 
"arm a grau i numero u i o 1 entaque be 11 a parabam 
edere, materia conueniente modis. 
par erat inferior uersus; risisse Cupido 
dicitur atque unum surripuisse pedem." (Amores, I.i.1-4) 
The House of Fame owes its conception to the Metamorphoses, that 
fictional bible of the Middle Ages, and the relationship between the two 
authors is one of innate sympathy as well as shared material. Both 
refuse to accept monolithic texts which mythologise the conventions of 
representation. Ovid allows "closure" only in the moment of 
metamorphosis, never permitting his characters the liberty (or 
constraint) of a fixed textual position like that foisted on "pius 
Aeneas", and constantly undermines older conventions. The pastoral 
lovers of the Georgics are displaced by the grasping urban meretrices 
whom Ovid pursues, the cosmic Gods of the Aeneid become clever 
hellenistic conceits. Chaucer also evades the rigidity of generic 
straitjackets and introduces a multiplicity cf voices, most notably in 
the Tales, and is committed to a belief in the conditional nature of 
texts. This is not a division between "high seriousness" and frivolity 
but a perfectly serious phi1oscphy, based en an understanding cf 
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literature which is rhetorical rather than illuminative. The different 
sense of representation is like that between, for example, Faulkner and 
Nabokov; the farmer's mimesis attempts to produce epiphanies of 
understanding by immersing one in the enclosed minds of his narrators, 
the latter constructs elegant word games around the obsessions of his 
characters, who constantly identify their accounts as their own created 
texts. 
In the House of Fame, the feminine voice signifies this opposition to 
the claustrophobic and dominating text. The reader is not allowed to 
let conventions of discourse like the epic mode become invisible and 
"taken as read" without being challenged by the strident objections of 
the cheated heroines. Chaucer merely records these contradictory 
positions without allowing his own authoritative voice to decide the 
matter for the reader. It is Dido's propaganda and the lonely voice of 
her complaint we hear for a moment drowning out the strains of arms and 
the man, not Chaucer's ironic prompting. 
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Dido's projected death, Aeneas'obligation to love, and the alleged oath 
that he has sworn are all used as ammunition against him. They are an 
illogically assorted cluster of influencing factors, connected 
principally by the merciless conventions governing an abandoned woman's 
swansong. There is no material necessity for her to end her existence 
but she is compelled to fulfill an expectation inherent in her 
literary/dramatic performance, situated in the style adopted by female 
martyrs from Perpetua to Clarissa to S. Therese de Lisieux. In this 
genre, the visible world is confined to the doomed woman's own 
heightened intuitions of events. Her drama becomes the central focus of 
cosmic events, assuming implications for all morality and all time. 
Against this kind of discourse Aeneas is silenced and excluded, for his 
is the language of heroism and founding patriarchy, ill-equipped to 
answer a word which insists on making itself flesh in self-immolation, 
demanding the last word. 
Dido's feminine resistance appeals also against the double standards of 
representation applied to men and women, their relative fame, in other 
words. Aeneas, she claims, has been assiduous in cultivating his own 
glory, and has used her not only for his "delyt" or "synguler profit", 
but also for fame and "magnyfynge of hys name" (HoF, 305-310). He has 
the opportunity, through heroic action, to establish a name for himself, 
but Dido is only to have the name given to her by a man - a husband - or 
that accorded her by Rumour. A summary of her dirge identifies her 
contention 
"O, wel-away that I was born! 
For throrgh yow is my name lorn, 
And alle mine actes red and songe 
Over al this land on every tonge ... 
(I am) yshamed ... thourgh Eneas, 
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(but) Al hir compleynt ne al hir moone, 
Certyn, avayleth hir not a stre." (HoF, 345-363) 
While it is certainly true that Dido has become a by-word among the 
people, her literary tour de force immortalises her in her funeral pyre 
just as much as Aeneas' exploits immortalize him. The battle of the 
genres is won in the Aenejd by epic seriousness, but the grievances of 
the feminine casualties beget their own set of writings, like the 
Herojdes, which remind the male protagonists of how much of their fame 
is owed to their helpmeets, and how paltry a recompense they gleaned 
(HoF, 383-425). Dido has struck a blow, not only against the fame of 
Aeneas, but against a monolithic masculinist textuality. Just as Venus 
begets Aeneas, the femininised tradition is claiming precedence over the 
"patriarchal" set of texts. This has two implications: firstly, that 
the female experience in these texts has been misrepresented and the 
fictional heroines mal(e)treated, and secondly a more theoretical 
subtext, that the epic mode is secondary, begotten by the female 
expression. Translated into the terms of textual dynamics, this claim 
is that literature exists not principally to enshrine and glorify the 
male exploit and its obvious and hyperbolic expression of the self; Fame 
in short, but to find terms of expressing desires and possibilities not 
available except in terms of fantasy, fiction, and projection; Love, in 
short. 
The negative effects of Dido's challenge are to call into question any 
posibility of Truth in texts if, as she claims, they are self-interested 
and exclusive constructions. Equally, her attempt to replace Aeneas' 
text with her own shows that any account of events may be re-made on 
radically different premises. Dido herself speaks to avoid becoming the 
passive victim of Rumour, which is nothing more than a set of texts made 
by other people in which their desires and "will to truth'' combine at 
random. Undoing one discourse obliges us to remember that all 
discourses may be unravelled and unmasked; is even Geffry's defence of 
Dido the product of anything more than an erotic attraction to 
celebrated women and a longing for literary fame? 
At this point we are better qualified to understand why the decorated 
temple opens the poem. Love and Literature are intertwined, and as 
Venus is the mother of desire, the great epic is the primary source of 
literature. More subtly, it is established that fictional discourses 
are generated by the emotional forces of desire, either positively in 
the modes of love-talk and courtship, or negatively in the darkly 
vengeful imprecations of cheated longings. The tangled textual 
relations of the two classical lovers are the locus classjcus of a crux 
in the development of western literary concerns and prototypes of all 
subsequent loves. Geffry is told by the eagle that he is to hear 
tidings of Love's folk, and in a way all literary people, all the people 
who exist in discourses of any kind are "love's folk", for they are 
constituted in texts which come into being because of the desires, 
projections, needs and fantasies of those who produce those texts. No 
speech is olympian and detached, even that of the gods or their 
servants. One such servant, the golden-feathered eagle, imagines 
himself as the objective speaker of Truth, and to this particular kind 
of fantasy we now turn. 
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AD ASTRA SUBLIMIS FEROR, 
VATES UT OLIM RAPTUS AD COELUM SENEX 
AURIGA CURRUS IGNEI. 
(Milton, "In Obitum Praesulis Eliensis") 
The second book, after a teasingly suspenseful 'proem', takes us from 
Virgil's world to Dante's (54). The Dantesque eagle which swoops from 
the heavens in answer to Geffry's prayer seems a worse predicament than 
abandonment. Geffry looks up at the golden image of impending 
salvation, scorching and lighting up the heavens as if in echo of the 
Transfiguration. Just as the apparition begins to descend, a structural 
division is inserted. There is more than sensationalism to this 
progression. The expectation is that the eagle - a symbol of 
enlightenment and far-seeing - will provide guidance through the hostile 
and barren landscape, as befits the mediating figure in dream visions. 
The proem increases expectation by insisting on the uniqueness of this 
vision. Not Isaiah, Scipio, Pharoah, or Turnus has seen such marvels. 
To do justice to the experience, the narrator calls on the aid of Venus, 
Apollo, and the psychological resources of one of his five inward wits, 
Thought. As if in answer, the first descriptions of the eagle are awe-
inspiring: 
"I gan beholde more and more, 
To se the beaute and the wonder." (HoF, 532-3) 
A hint of bathos is contained in the mildly surprised aside: 
"But never was there dynt of thonder, 
Ne that thing that man calle fouder ... " (HoF, 534-5) 
If the eagle be the messenger of Jove, Geffry's ego would like to be 
flattered with a thunder-bolt out of the Olympian's endless stock. 
Nonetheless, being swept up in the eagle's "grymme pawes'' to 
extraordinary heights is terrifying in itself, and sends Geffry into a 
swoon. 
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Apart from its station as most worthy of the noble (predatory) birds, 
the eagle is traditionally a bird which symbolises acuity. It is the 
only creature which may look on the sun without shading its eyes, a 
trait allegorised in the bestiary as a type of clear understanding. 
As the symbol of the evangelist, St John, the bird implies revelation of 
a supernatural kind which culminates in the unveiling of the last 
things. Centuries of worshippers have heard the Scriptures read from 
lecterns fashioned in the shape of eagles, as they were in fourteenth 
century churches. The least one might expect from a bird of such 
distinguished pedigree is dignity. At best, he might open the secrets 
of the universe (55). 
Geffry is aroused (in the first of a succession of deflations) by a 
voice which he recognises as the same as "oon I coude nevene''. Unkind 
critics have suggested that this "mannish" voice could be his wife's; 
whatever the truth of the suggestion, it is not the kind of encounter 
that inspires awe at recognition. (Compare, for example, the homage 
that Dante pays to Virgil at their initial encounter). The eagle's cry, 
although harsh, is still more friendly than the habitual tone of the 
familiar voice, an obviously cheap crack at somebody's expense, no doubt 
to the amusement of the audience. The eagle revives his burden, and 
then complains at its excessive weight, simultaneously reducing our 
sense of his mysterious power and poking fun at the portly Geffry. The 
ridiculous dangling figure begins to wonder whether this signal honour 
portends an approaching ''stellification" - a trophy of enduring fame 
reserved for the more prominent mythological heroes - or whether, like 
Elijah or Enoch he has been deemed worthy of escaping the pangs of death 
and proceeding directly to Heaven. A self - satisfied expression begins 
to play about his features at the idea and is promptly squashed by the 
eagle in wryly disparaging tones: 
"Thou demest of thyself amys; 
For Joves ys not theraboute -
I dar wel put the out of doute -
To make of the as yet a sterre" (HoF, 596-599) 
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The puncturing irony of "as yet" deflates Geffry's pipe-dream, but also 
does the more subtle job of exhibiting to the readers his ingrained 
inclination to make everything "literary". Rather than taking in the 
details of a view unique in human experience, Geffry is indulging in a 
fantasy from the world of his books, casting himself as the hero. The 
invincible fiction-making propensities of the mind interpret reality 
according to conventional models of self-glorifying desire. Part of the 
eagle's task as Geffry's celestial ferry is to correct that condition. 
The extraordinary event Geffry is about to experience is a marvellously 
apt dream fulfilment. The people of his bookish imagination are to come 
alive and respond to his devotion, and all his cherished fantasies are 
to take on an existence independent of both their textual prisons and 
the confines of his imagination. The forms which Love's folk assume 
will prove to be governed by a set of rules as arbitrary as those which 
govern their behaviour, and coded into a system which operates in a way 
as unpredictable as the workings of desire. 
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The reward comes in response to Geffry's long service to Love as a 
literary topos. He has lived like a hermit in worship of a deity, 
spending late nights in attempts at new tales of romance. Despite this 
abstinence he has received no recompense, and no tidings of love have 
reached him. Whether this refers to a case of writer's block is not 
clear. There appears to be no reason to believe that Geffry canbt find 
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subject matter for his pen while he "in hir matere al devisest'' (HoF, 
637). Rather it seems that Geffry cannot understand the way stories of 
love really operate, for his knowledge is limited to his inadequate 
readings of books. It is easy to read this as a kind of plea for 
"realism'' and an engagement with the physical and empirical world. Some 
have suggested this as the primary intention of the work - that Geffry 
is used as a vehicle through which Chaucer expresses a new sense of 
appreciation of the things of the every-day world stretching around him 
(56). That this is not so one may deduce from the highly artificial 
corollary to this section. If Geffry were suddenly imbued with a desire 
to produce realist documentary fiction, he would surely find himself in 
the next episode of the poem in an ordinary and unremarkable scene of 
normal existence rather than in the bizarre pantheon of Fame which in 
fact follows. 
The progression of the eagle's explanation follows the course it does 
almost in answer to this position. It first draws attention to the 
various kinds of love and the inexplicability of the phenomenon. It 
then expresses the copia of varieties of love - the flushes of first 
love, the long-held devotions, the surprising and improbable affections 
that arise with as much reason as when "a blind man stert an hare'' (HoF, 
681). These are followed with the other eruptions of emotion caused by 
love - the contention, jealousy, rumour, false representation and 
treachery - all of which, combined, would exceed meaningful mathematical 
expression, more than the grains of the sea-sand or the seeds of corn in 
barns or the tunes that may be plucked from stringed instruments. The 
last is an especially telling comparison, in that it shows the 
similarities between Love, Music, and Language as rhetorical systems. 
In each, sets of conventional tropes serve as the medium for 
transmitting individual sensation and sentiment. 
Geffry finds it incredible that Fame should have the power to catalogue 
such a vast number of emotions. The answer is telling. All speech, the 
eagle says, rises of its natural properties to a particular place in the 
heavens, just at the edge of the sublunary sphere. Love can only be 
traced and charted when it is turned into a speech-act, at which point 
is is inescapably encoded into the rules of language and Fame. This 
view of language as another artefact in the physical world 
denaturalises it from its pivileged position as the mediator of 
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consciousness, and highlights its artificial origins. All speech is 
governed by two contradictory principles; it is motivated by unique acts 
of desire on the one hand while on the other it becomes part of an 
impersonal and material system of communication. This inhuman and 
mathematical behaviour of the spoken word returns to vex users of 
language as it emerges from a sojourn in the halls of Fame and haunts 
all subsequent discourse. 
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Like Language, the concept of Love is not a natural phenomenon. Human 
beings do not rut "like brute beasts that have no understanding" but 
behave according to an artificial construct - the erotic idea, in which 
emotions are the result of private fantasies imposed upon the object of 
desire. Beloved partners play a part in our private narratives of which 
they are not aware. The place of Love in the world of Nature, of which 
the eagle is a representative, is as tenuous as that of speech. 
The figure of the goddess Natura has an importance in the vision poetry 
of the Middle Ages which is profound, and requires more extensive 
treatment than is possible here (57). In the influential work of Alain 
de Lille, the goddess assumes the elevated role of vice-regent of 
creation below the creator himself; like Wisdom she is the power of the 
divine being in action. Her special care is the power of generation 
which God has given to man, and the corruption of which she ceaselessly 
laments. The sexual organs are the tools of her trade, to be used in 
lawful and fruitful coupling, not idealised abstinence, promiscuity or 
homosexual perversion. The sophisticated, literary fantasies of Love 
which are Geffry's stock in trade are, at best, irrelevent to her grand 
design. The Parliament of Fowls, a love vision inspired by the "Pleynt 
of Kynde", deals with the dichotomy of Nature and Culture with regard to 
sexual relations. The noble birds of prey are paradigms of the courtly 
love convention and look in horrified disdain on the indiscriminate 
self-indulgence of the lesser fowl. But the humbler birds choose their 
mates simply and sensibly, in stark contrast to the competition between 
the terclets for the love of the formel. The queenly eagle refuses to 
be governed by Venus or Cupid, and the whole lot of courtly love birds 
remain unmatched for another year. Nature's laws are being intricately 
frustrated by the synthetic doctrines of love-service, to nobody's clear 
advantage. Geffry's eagle is not a romantic bird. Brusquely, he proves 
himself to be a creature of Nature, and not a servant of the allegorized 
goddess, but a civil servant in the material and physical creation of 
Jove. 
The eagle had far rather propound the laws of matter and the hierarchy 
of created things than squander breath on Love. He delivers a 
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surprisingly Einsteinian account of sound waves taken from Vincent of 
Beauvais (Speculum Naturae, 4.14), showing how they spread in concentric 
rings from a focal point of impact, much like the rings in water 
disturbed by a stone (HoF, 782ff). Sound rises to the heavens because 
it is out of its "kynde place", and must return to it. In consequence, 
one would expect both the benevolent care of Nature for sound and that 
Fame might mirror some of the qualities of her orderly colleague. On 
both counts the expectation is disappointed. Nature is not concerned 
with the content or properties of speech, and merely relays the 
phenomenon to Fame. 
In the terms of this cosmology no words can escape the verdict of Fame -
as gravity is to matter so Fame is to language. It orders, controls, 
selects, and recombines words as Nature oversees the pattern of life and 
growth. However, the eagle does not differentiate between "speche'' and 
"soun'~ an attitude which lowers intelligible discourse to the same level 
as any other noise, as Swift does in the Tale of a Tub: 
"Words are but Wind; and learning is nothing but Words; Ergo, Learning 
is nothing but wind." 
The eagle is absolutely devoid of any understanding of the value or 
power of words or emotion, a pragmatist who sets no store by poetry, but 
whose diatribe is no less flatulent as a result. 
The lecture given by the eagle also indicates that the natural world is 
not directly accessible to language, for not only does its meaning elude 
natural laws and natural order but rhetoric obscures any attempt at a 
mimesis (even a "scientific" one) of the real. The eagle claims to have 
given an address that is 
"Withoute any subtilite 
Of speche, or grete prolixite 
Of termes of philosophie, 
Of figures of poetrie, 
Or colours or rethorike?" (HoF, 855-859) 
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But like the Franklin, the eagle is less than accurate in his 
protestations of plain speaking. Even this perorat;o is distinguished 
in its use of anaphora and quattuorcolonic repetition. The speech also 
perhaps reminds the new Aristotelean scientific empiricists of the 
limits of their enterprise and of the value of the unfashionable 
disciplines of the literary curriculum. The eagle's pride at his 
performance is nicely undercut in Chaucer's ironical use of avian 
vocabulary. The bird is smug at his facility in an appropriate level of 
lexis, speaking "lewedly to a lewed man" with such success that the lewd 
listener might well shake his beak in agreement. That humans are not 
blessed with beaks is a concept that escapes the winged pedant who, like 
all self-important bombasts, is oblivious of any more interesting 
audience than himself and forgetful of the fact that his words also will 
appear before the merciless bar of Fame. 
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The ultimate irony played out against the eagle is that, despite his 
scientific assurance and blase realism, he himself is a literary figment 
and is flying through an incredible and mythological cosmos where none 
of his carefully conned data applies. He is obviously unable to 
extricate his scientific from his literary knowledge, for his account of 
the Milky Way as the path of Phaeton's chariot is fictional in terms of 
the waking world's canons of the true, just as his explanation of sound 
is out of place in a cosmos where words become living people. After he 
directs Geffry's gaze downward to the rapidly vanishing globe, he 
recalls that neither Alexander, Scipio, nor Daedalus ever flew as high -
a dubious string of allusions for a bird of science. 
Geffry, who has until this point taken the monosyllabic course of least 
resistance finally puts up a show of stubborn independence on being 
ordered to inspect the zodiacal figures at close quarters. No doubt 
annoyed at having a reverie in which he was once again musing over his 
experience in the light of the flights of philosophy towa;d truth (apres 
Boethius) and the mysterious intimations of St. Paul -interrupted; and 
just when he was deciding that, on balance, he was beginning to believe 
the reliability of the Anticlaudianus , Geffry refuses. He claims that 
he is too old to be further enlightened, and is not relieved to detect 
the eagle launching himself into another didactic ramble about the 
positions and history of the constellations. "No fors!", he cries, 
twice, before halting his guide in mid flight. In merciful silence they 
proceed until the mighty rumbling of a tide of speech washing through 
the portals of Fame's palaces stirs Geffry to ask the source of the 
sound. 
The eagle explains that the sounds reconstitute themselves on arrival 
into the images of their original speakers, and are consequently easily 
identifiable. The image owes something to the idea of the corporeal 
resurrection of the dead depicted in so many churches of the period. He 
leaves with the slightly insulting hope that Geffry will learn something 
of use in the place, and - to remind us finally that he is an animal, 
and not human - his parthian shot is a beast's idea of useful 
encouragement -
"'Nay drede the not therof,' quod he, 
'Hyt is nothing will byten the ... '" (HoF, 1043-5) 
THE STATE OF THE ART 
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The first thing to confront Geffry on arrival is a mountain of glass -
or so it appears. The glass mountain is a folk-lore motif one might 
expect to find in Childe Roland or a fairy story - the sort of daunting 
barrier a hero would overcome in a death-defying feat of bravery. Like 
the crystal sea of the Apocalypse it signals an eternal city, a 
principle which is at unity in itself, clear and without contradictions. 
On closer inspection, however, the peak proves to be formed entirely of 
ice. The contrast is surprising, but revealing. If one reads the 
ascent of the mountain as a metaphor of the ars 7onga, vita brevis idea, 
with the force that an aspirant poet has a long and arduous track to 
climb, a long struggle to the top of a solid mass would be at least an 
achievement of similar solidity. If the peak be ice, it is a foundation 
as fickle as that of the man who "built his house upon sand'' (cf HoF, 
1132-3). On the slopes are engraved the names of those who were the 
glory of their times, now sadly perished and almost illeaible, as though 
they had never been. They were not buffeted away by storms. The simple 
process of heat has gently melted them, just as Fame lapses not by 
persecution but by the imperceptibly slow and unplanned loss of 
interest. Only the shade of the palace at the summit has saved some of 
the inscriptions from oblivion, indeed, kept them as fresh as the day 
they were carved. If even the shadow of the wings of Fame is potent 
enough to stave off ruin, what may be the power of her inner sanctum? 
The palace of words is, as one would expect, beyond the power of words 
to describe (a part cannot contain its whole) and exceedingly elaborate. 
It is really of stone - of one perfect beryl, a stone credited with the 
property of making love increase in the lapidary, and encrusted with the 
flamboyant lavishness of late gothic art. Surrounding the castle on all 
sides are the wandering minstrels of the past - rhetorjces, bards, 
troubadours, and harpers. It is their role to transmit Fame's stories, 
and a school of minstrelsy is in progress in which lesser talents sit at 
the feet of the great Orpheus, Orion, Chiron and the British Glascurion, 
imitating them "as craft countrefeteth kynde" (HoF, 1213). Each bears 
the instrument appropriate to his subject matter. Pastoral poets bear 
their oaten flutes, Dutch singers their pipes, war-poets a martial 
trumpet. There is also a more dubious mob in this galaxy of performers 
who are magicians, pythonesses, witches and sorcerers. Medea, Circe, 
Hermes Balenus, and Simon Magus are among those whose speciality it was 
to make low tricks of conjuring appear real. Only now does Geffry 
encounter the sovereign lady of the city set on the hill. 
SHE SEEMED A THING THAT COULD NOT FEEL 
THE TOUCH OF EARTHLY YEARS 
As he enters the castle gates, Geffry hears Fame being proclaimed in the 
style which befits a great lady. 
"'God save the lady of this pel, 
Our oune gentil lady Fame,'" (HoF, 1310-1) 
Before her is a procession of nobles bedecked in the fineries of their 
station - crowns, ribbons, and fringes - attended by their heralds. 
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chivalry from the whole known world and their outward glories are worn 
rightfully and truthfully, not as an easily copied piece of social 
pretension. Such, at least,is the truth that they would have us believe. 
Fame holds court in a hall rich and strange, thick with gold and all the 
gems in the lapidary. She presides from a throne formed of a single 
ruby and is hideous beyond belief. Others of her features include her 
enormous height (she seems to stretch from earth to heaven), wild 
gorgon-like hair and thousands of ears, eyes, and tongues. She is 
surrounded by the heavenly music of the Muses, who hymn her eternally: 
"'Hereyed be thou and thy name, 
Goddesse of Renoun or Fame!'" (HoF, 1044-5) 
As literary trope, Fame is a combination of three strands of tradition -
the Virgilian, Ovidian and Boethian. From each she takes a grotesque 
adornment, in each she is seen as the enemy of "true" speech who 
misleads men and destroys with her barbed fabrications. 
In order of precedence, Virgil's portrayal is first. In the fourth book 
of the Aeneid (173ff), Fama (Rumour) brings the news of Dido's 
entanglement with Aeneas to the nations round about. Like a plague the 
dea foeda terrorizes cities by day, and flying at night, she swells and 
grows as she travels. She is the last-born daughter of Earth, an awe-
inspiring creature with her head in the clouds and her feet on the 
ground, a kaleidoscope of whirling eyes, ears, mouths, and baying 
tongues. She bears news to Iarbas which sets i~ motion the tragedy of 
Aeneas' departure and Dido's suicide. Fame's multiplex sermo (Aeneid, 
IV 189) is an amalgamation of truth and falsehood which is the opposite 
of the language of the poet as vates, teller of the truth. Her random 
passing of news is the discourse of chaos - unselected, unverifiable, 
corrupting, and ultimately the channel through which tragedy and 
meaninglessness descend upon human lives. 
Ovid accepts Virgil's model of Fame, but in the plastic world of 
metamorphosis such a phenomenon is not the anathema she miqht be in the 
heroic vision. She simply embodies the way things happen to be in the 
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world. In Metamorphoses 9, 137 ff, Fama loquax brings news to Deianira 
of Hercules in a ferment of true and false undifferentiated, spread 
beyond control or deliberate intention. In anfoxpanded description at 
Metamorphoses 12,39 ff, Ovid gives a topographical view of Fame's abode 
(the immediate source of Chaucer's poem). The house is in the centre of 
earth, sea, and sky; open ,and made of echoing brass. All words come 
here and are echoed endlessly as mutating and murmuring confusa verba. 
This is essentially Chaucer's vision of Fame as an inescapable force 
operating in language. Fame is the inevitable result of the material 
nature of language, which is independent of its speakers and survives 
beyond its immediate usefulness in the forms of texts, tales, and 
traditions. The description also demonstrates the paradox of Art which 
by making a fiction which is untrue, evokes a better impression of the 
truth of the operations of Fame. Poetry, like Fame's tidings, is 
continually receding from its subject matter into more and more 
insubstantial layers of textual fictionality. 
In the Consolation of Philosophy, Fame and her works are dismissed along 
with those meretrices, the Muses, by the Lady Philosophy. In Book 2 of 
the work,· Philosophy prises the narrator away from earthly affections by 
showing the insignificnt and ephemeral nature of fame when seen sub 
specie aeternitatis. Nations, languages, authors, and the tedious 
realities of history, militate against the private fantasies of enduring 
fame. Like the other bitch-goddess, Fortune, Fame (even as gloria) is a 
worthless trap of desire and projection. This stern renunciation of 
Fame gives Chaucer a sense of the flaws even in good reputations, for 
all good names are only the labels of the fickle mob, "hosanna!" today 
and "crucify!" tomorrow. It grounds his perceptions not only in the 
verbal web woven by philosophy, but in a tradition which looks beyond 
mere words for its ultimate verification. 
The House of Fame also echoes Revelation, because Fame's house is a type 
of the city of the Last Judgement. The after-life of words culminates 
not in equitable justice, separating the sheep and the goats, the true 
from the false, but in interminable confusion where unresolved 
representations endlessly repeat themselves before an arbitrary judge. 
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Fame is finally the obverse of the "judge of all the earth", in whom all 
certainty resides. 
There are several things to be noted here. The personification allegory 
of a female form is a familiar convention, displacing the rational and 
merciful male deity with feminine inconsistency and injustice. Her 
gorgon-like behaviour typifies the aggressive female, and the fact that 
the Muses - traditionally the companions of Apollo - appear to be in her 
service is another example of the way in which Fame has occupied 
traditionally male territory. In a consummate irony, her female 
shoulders are what bear up the reputation of the heroes Alexander and 
Hercules, not the raw empirical fact of their exploits, nor the 
masculine builders of their poetic reputations. 
The feminine concept attracts male desire, for better or for worse. The 
empowering love of the virgin heroine is matched by the paralysing 
castration of the gorgon witch. Equally, when the feminine is used 
ideologically as an embodiment of the "other", she may be either the 
symbol of an ideal perfection which inspires devotion and wonder (Wisdom 
or the Blessed Virgin) or she may be a perverse and wicked expression of 
the vagaries of malign fate or reprehensible emotion (Fortune, the Fates 
or the Harpies). In either case, the siren song of these enchantresses 
is irresistable to men and fascinating in texts. 
The figure of Fame around whom the poem is structured is a typical 
feminine personification of this tradition. She embodies a set of anti-
Apollonian, subversive and seductive values. Like Catullus' women we 
have noted, her words are written in water, not carved in stone as the 
epic text would be. Feminine and malign, she is just the sort of 
monster one might meet in a nightmare, an object of an inescapably 
perverse desire. To meet her in a celestial judgement hall where 
language is assessed is a nightmare which engulfs a whole culture. 
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THE HALL OF FAME 
"Hi narrata ferunt alio, mensuraque ficti 
crescit, et auditis aliquid novus adicit auctor." 
Ovid, Metamorphoses, XII 55-6. 
Further into the hall are the rows of pillars , on each of which is set 
a great writer whose works have helped establish the fame of a 
particular event, nation or person. Josephus for Israel, Statius for 
Thebes, Homer for Troy, Geoffry of Monmouth for England, and Virgil for 
Rome, are part of the numberless multitude. Each pedestal is 
constructed of a metal appropriate in its symbolic connotations to the 
poet's subject matter - so epic poets sit on pillars of lead and iron, 
the metals of Mars and Saturn respectively, and Ovid - a love-elegist -
sits on copper, the metal of Venus. The clamour of these erstwhile 
poets fills the air with a "ful confus matere" like the sound of a 
rookery. 
The curious inversion of the hall is that it is not a showcase for the 
heroes, but for their publicists. The writers and bards who have sung 
the praises of their subjects have created and displaced them (58). The 
real and the primal events are lost behind the welter of artistic 
plasticity. It is not history which provides Fame's luminaries, but the 
successful fictions of artists. The artists in turn are the vessels of 
their Muses - that inexplicable, feminized creative force which sings in 
them. 
The authors may be guilty of propagating slanted history and partial 
memories. The great Homer is accused of favouring the Greeks: 
"Oon seyde that Omer made lyes, 
Feynynge in his poetries" (Hof, 1478-9) 
A reminder that even the most hallowed histories mingle "fantasie" with 
fact. Britons had good reason to decry Homer's version, as their 
founding epic claimed the Trojan Brutus as Father of the race. If the 
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mists of the past cannot be dispelled, and the constructions of over-
ingenious chroniclers are art, not fact, then History becomes one of the 
victims of Fame, and the past a closed book. As Frederic Jameson 
expresses it; 
"History is not a text, not a narrative, master or 
otherwise but that as an absent cause, it is 
inaccessible to us except in textual form." (59) 
The sons which Time, "like an ever-rolling stream", bears away are 
reborn as the bastards of the prostitute-goddess, who also, in turn, 
devours her children. 
"CLERE LAUDE/SKLAUNDRE" 
YER PAYS YER MONEY ... 
Before the throne of Fame, a band of petitioners beg for her good 
offices. In response, she calls up her servant Eolus, "the god of 
wynde" (HoF, 1571) with his two trumpets. One is called "Clere Laude", 
the other, "Sklaundre''. With these, the master of the winds may bruit 
abroad the reputation which Fame chooses to grant. The baroque 
operatics of this process are given several splendid descriptions; the 
black trumpet emits smoke of "Blak, bloo, grenyssh, swartish red'' (HoF, 
1647) and the golden one smells like "a pot of bawme ... Among a basket 
ful of roses 11 (HoF, 1686- 7). 
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But the real interest of the passage is the methodical way in which 
Fame, although appearing to be utterly arbitrary, in fact covers all the 
possible options of recognition. One may only be obscure, renowned, or 
infamous in the collective memory, and groups approach Fame with each of 
these intentions. In each case, the group is awarded one of the three 
possible alternatives, but without regard for their hopes or express 
requests. Again, the gap between the delicate reveries of the 
petitioners and the harsh realities of their fates demonstrates that 
language is beyond control, and governed by "natural" laws of immense 
and inhuman intricacy. 
The whole rigmarole shows Fame as mistress of a random mathematical 
formula, designed to cater as little to human multiplicity and 
individuality as is possible to imagine. Eugene Vance makes a 
suggestive analogy between money in an exchange system which, like that 
of the fourteenth century, is subject to rampant inflation (60). Human 
sensibilities are relentlessly bulldozed by the conceptual monsters of 
compound interest and exchange rate discrepancies in the same manner 
adopted by Fame. History is not only a human construct. Even if "men 
make their own histories", they "do not make them in circumstances of 
their own choosing". History under the control of Fame becomes a memory 
out of control, a data-bank generating random information under the 
guise of truth. 
Geffry, chastened by this spectacle, is asked by an anonymous man 
standing behind him if he also desires Fame. He replies that he will 
take refuge in his art and take the consequences as they come. His real 
search is for "tydynges", something new and original not yet 
appropriated by the great masters in the pantheon of Fame. In answer he 
is sent to the house in the valley, the strangest he has ever seen, 
which spins in one place "as swyfte as thought" (HoF, 1924) 
DOMUS DEDALY 
The house is the work of the legendary master craftsman, Daedalus. His 
name is synonymous with ''craft", and literature with the Labyrinth 
(labor intus) he constructed on the isle of Crete. The implications of 
such an identification cover the whole range of human constructs, for 
Daedalus is master of all ingenuity, fertile in devices from 
architecture to weaponry to flight. Knowledge, and even life itself, 
are likened to the maze. Umberto Eco employs the image for his library 
in The Name of the Rose where it is a snare of signs twisted around one 
another in perpetual toils. The patterns on cathedral floors, 
"Jerusa 1 ems", have been interpreted as maze-images of the pilgrimage of 
life, at the end and centre of which is the celestial city. Joyce uses 
Daedalus' name for Stephen, his artist persona in Portrait of the 
Artist. The writer is a maker and manipulator of the networks of 
64 
language, but what Geffry's new intelligence implies is that the writer 
too is the victim and and tool of his medium. As Icarus' flight ended 
in disaster, so too may the passage on the "feathers of philosophy". 
The house is made of a hugger-mugger heap of twigs of several colours 
and has entrances on all sides. Nothing may shut it off from the 
elements - or rather element, for all is sound here. Every corner of 
the dwelling is stuffed with "tydynges", "whisprynges", 11 rounynges", and 
"jangles" about every happening under the sun and moon. An acurvatio of 
sixteen lines follows, all breathlessly begun with an anaphora of 
"of's 11 , a list of all-enclosing dimensions. Peeping through one of the 
endless windows, Geffry sees a mob beyond description enormous, crammed 
into its narrow space. 
The people of the house exchange hurried and interrupted gossip in 
muddled half-sentences: 
"'Thus hath he sayd,' and 'Thus he doth,' 
'Thus shal hit be,' 'Thus herhe y seye,' 
'That shal be founde,'' That dar I leye'" (HoF, 2052-4). 
and as the news is told, it mutates in the telling and grows like fire 
consuming a city. Like repulsive and comical beasts, Geffry sees "a 
lesyng and a sad soth sawe" both stuck in the same window and fighting 
over who should escape first. Like Tweedledum and Tweedledee, their 
petulant battle ends with sworn brotherhood, and truth and falsehood 
become indistinguishable twins (HoF, 2089-2109). 
The nightmare grows worse. It assumes the likeness of a harbour, busy 
exporting the corrupt mixture back to the world that spawned it on 
Eolus' winds and the words of sailors, pilgrims, pardoners, and 
messengers. A sudden frenzy sends the swarm rushing towards some 
epiphany in a corner of the hall in an undignified scramble. Between 
the bodies, Geffry catches a glimpse of what seems to be an 
authoritative notable, a man ... but of what type or station we shall 
never know, for at this point the manuscript consigns its most singular 
character to oblivion by ending. 
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ITS A VERY STRANGE THING, AS STRANGE AS CAN BE 
THAT WHATEVER MISS T. EATS TURNS INTO MISS T. 
Walter de la Mare, "Mjss T". 
"C'est dans la langue que l'homme se constitue comme sujet. Est 'ego' 
qui dit 'ego'." 
E. Benveniste. 
At the end of his poem, Chaucer has demonstrated that there is no final 
authority in the world of language capable of stilling the cosmos of 
communication. He shows that language is, like the library of books in 
Russell's paradox, a self-referential system which cannot define itself 
as true or false while using itself as medium and evidence. All 
perception becomes language in the verbum mentis, all thought is formed 
already in its moulds, all ideas leave the speaking subject in its 
capacious code. Only God is "his own interpreter", for he is the 
Archimedian point from which objective truth proceeds, while words 
remain ensnared in their self-generated morass. 
Every word, however inspired, from whatever prophetic or artistic 
source, enters the common streams of speech and is subject to its laws. 
Even poems, however elevated, are made of words rather than ideas, and 
words are linguistic artifacts, tools only, not to be conjured into 
sources of intrinsic authority. In one way, words die once they leave 
the minds and mouths which use them as an inadequate semaphore of their 
mental processes. In a more sinister fashion, they are renewed as 
independent and parasitic beings when they are so released, and prey 
upon their creators. 
As a manipulation of signs, the House of Fame is obliged to end in 
silence when threatened by a final, accurate, and unequivocal authority, 
for signs may not be tamed by one of their own number. There are 
authorities in Chaucer's world, but they are not in the first instance 
linguistic. Dwelling in the silent darkness of the soul are unspeakable 
mysteries, and in the sharp brilliance of revelation are things that 
"ear hath not heard, eye hath not seen". But at the approach of things 
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so high and wonderful there is no response but silence. If we demand 
clarity and unity from the babble of the House of Fame, we are condemn 
it to silence for we expect words to do what they, by their very nature, 
cannot do - mean what they say without the means to say the unsayable. 
And this is a thing that 
" ... al the folk that ys alyve 
Ne han the kunnynge to discryve" (HoF, 2055-6). 
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1) Kittredge, (1915) pp.81-4 
2) Immelman, R., 1912. 'Chaucer's Haus der Fama', Englische 
Studien 45, pp.397-431. 
3) Riedel, F.R., 1928. 'The Meaning of Chaucer's House of 
Fame', JEGP 27, pp.441-69. 
4) Notably, B. Ten Brink, 1870. Chaucer Studien, Munster, 
and A. Rambeau, 1880. in Englische Studien 3, p.209ff. 
See Sypherd, ( 1907) . 
5) Sypherd, ibid. 
6) Ruggiers, (1953). 
7) Brown, (1917). 
8) Baker, (1966). 
9) Ruggiers, (1953). 
10) Goffin, (1943). 
11) Koonce, (1966). 
12) Winny, (1973). 
13) Baum, P.F., 1941, 'Chaucer's The House of Fame', ELH 
VII, pp. 255-6. 
14) Koonce, (1966), passim. 
15) Boitani, (1984). 
16) Delany, (1972). 
18) Bennett, (1968), p.xi 
19) Spearing, (1976). 
20) Quoted in Josipovici, (1971), p. 
21) Koonce, (1966), Ch.8. 
22) Delaney, (1972), pp.58-68. 
23) Peden, (1988). 
24) Fyler·, (1979), ~.27. 
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25) Lane Fox, (1986) pp.155-58. The classification of the Oneirocritica 
clearly shares a common source with Macrobius, and bears strong 
similarities with the schema given in the Proem of the House of Fame. 
Cf. C. Blum, 1936, Studies in the Dream Book of Artemidorus. 
26) Plato's own opinions vary from denunciation in the Republic to a 
story Socrates tells in the Phaedo of a dream in which he was instructed 
to write music, an intimation he obeyed by composing a hymn and 
versification of Aesop. Neoplatonists were generally favourable to the 
idea of dreams, perhaps because they encountered in them the lesser 
daemones or recalled their pre-incarnate existences. Cf. Iamblicus 
(c.300). 
27) Aristotle dismissed the notion of dream revelation as contrary to 
reason. See On Dreams, and On Prophecy in Sleep. His position is 
remarkable in a period when dreams were universally considered to be 
oracular. He sees dreams as the result of a natural cause, heat, acting 
on the sleeping mind. The result is a set of magnified and distorted 
perceptions, like "pictures in water". As the lower animals also appear 
to dream, he dismisses the divine origin of the phenomenon. 
The following application of Ockham's razor is a masterpiece of 
understated rationalism: " ... the fact that one can see no reasonable 
cause why it should be so (i.e., dreams prophetic) makes one distrust 
it, the idea that it is God who sends it, apart from its improbability 
on other grounds, is strange, especially as it does not come to the best 
and wisest, but to any chance persons. But, if we dismiss the theory 
that it comes from God, there seems no other possible explanation left" 
On Prophecy in Sleep, I. In the second book of the same work, he avers: 
"But the most skilful judge of dreams is the man who posses the ability 
to detect likenesses ... ", an almost psychoanalytic/artistic position, 
emphasizing the similarity of dreams to art. 
28) See De Divinatione, II lxxii 148, "Let us reject, therefore, this 
divination of dreams ... For to speak truly, that superstition has 
extended itself through all the nations, and has betrayed them into 
countless imbecilities." 
29) Lane Fox, (1986), pp.102-167. 
30) Acts, 14:8-18. 
31) See e.g. the Shepherd of Hermas, in which the church is allegorized 
as a female figure that gives advice to the dreamer, who also offers 
angelic opinions on fasting and theology. Also Fourth Ezra, in which 
the angel Uriel appears as dream guide. The "tour" of Heaven and Hell 
took on great importance beginning in e.g. parts of First Enoch, the 
Apocalypse of Peter, (second century), and the Acts of Thomas, (third 
century). Most influential in the West was the Vision of S.Paul, 
translated in the fifth century, and purporting to be an account of the 
apostle's experience of the third Heaven. The Gospel of Nicodemus, 
source of the Harrowing of Hell, had a wide public, as did also 
Drycthclm's vision in Bede's History, V 12. The papLll.:!rit:,' of thc::;c 
pseudo-authoritative writings was a sufficient warning to limit their 
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numbers and influence wherever possible. Note also their similarity to 
such pagan literary dreams of other authoritative worlds as that of 
Aeneid VI, Odyssey XI, or the myth of Er, Republic X. 
32) Scriptural tradition is divided. Four divergent strains may be seen 
in the Old Testament -
i) The dream riddle, susceptible to interpretation by a 
"seer". Cf. Joseph's fat and thin cows (Genesis, 41:14-36). The signs 
were generally obscure as in the "writing on the wall" read by Daniel as 
an omen of the collapse of the Persian state (Daniel, 5:17-29). 
ii) Dreams of prophets, in which the visionary received 
divine instruction e.g. Ezekiel, passim. Note Elihu's words to Job 
" ... in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are 
sleeping in their beds: 
Then he openeth the ears of men, and teaching 
instructeth them in what they learn." (Job, 33:15-6) 
iii) Direct visions could be granted in extraordinary 
cases e.g, " ... with my servant Moses who is most faithful in all my 
house ... I will speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by 
riddles doth he see the Lord" (Numbers, 12:6-8) 
iv) As a reaction, perhaps, against Chaldean 
soothsaying, dreams sometimes received outright condemnation 
e.g. "neither harken to your dreams which ye caused to be dreamed. I 
have not sent them, saith Jehovah." (Jeremiah, 29:8-9) 
The New Testament is simpler. The five dreams of the gospels are not 
esoteric e.g. the oriental type of dreams in Matthew, in which Joseph is 
warned (Matthew, 1:18-25/2:14-22). Peter's "unclean beasts" dream makes 
a simple moral point, and has the authority of the apostolic leader 
(Acts, 10:lOff). Most varied are the waking visions of e.g. Stephen's 
martyrdom or Paul' Damascus road experience. Paul's allusion to secret 
wisdom (II Corinthians, 12:1-4) and the Apocalypse share the mystery of 
coming from unknown sources of God's communication. 
33) Compare the montanist, Tertullian, who saw dreams as marks of grace, 
Origen, who found them unremarkable and normal, and Augustine, generally 
hostile - see De Genesi ad Litteram, XII ii; xiii; xxx. or De Trinitate, 
XI iv 7. 
34) Gregory sees dreams as works of wickedness in almost all cases, see 
Dialogi, IV 48. 
35) e.g. the dreams of S.Martin around which there was a considerable 
cultus, recorded by Gregory of Tours: De Virt"ibus sancti Martini, c.LVI. 
A. 
36) Le Goff, (1980), p.20lff. 
37) As a type of the beatific vision the visio intellectualis avoided 
the twin pitfalls of the v. spiritualis, which mixed sensual with 
spiritual perceptions and the v. corporalis which is ordinary seeing. 
38) S.Thomas is undecided. 
may be the work of demons. 
39) Colish, (1968), passim. 
Some dreams have to be acknowledged, others 
See Summa Theologica, Pt.2, Q.5, Art.6. 
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40) Delany, (1972), Ch.2, Boitani, (1984), pp.212-215. 
41) Curry, (1960), Lynch, (1988), pp.26-34. 
42) Lynch, ibid, 21-45. 
43) Sypherd, (1907), 74-76. 
44) Ibid, passim. 
45) Josipovici, (1971), passim. 
46) Lewis, (1936), Ch.2. 
47) Chretien de Troyes, [rec et Enide, Cliges, Yvain, Lancelot, and 
especially the Conte de Graal. 
48) See Malory's ''Tale of the Sankgreal", for Perceval, XIV, 368-9. 
Note the use made of it also in T.H. White, The Once And Future King, 
1962, Fontana, pp. 440-5. 
49) Lewis, (1936), p.61. 
50) Fleming, (1969), p.54-5. 
51) Especially in the Cratylus and the Republic, X. 
52) e.g. Garbarty, (1974) 
53) See Tisdale, (1973), Brewer Hall, (1963), among others. 
54) Dante's eagle is from the Purgatorio, IX 28-30, cf. Metamorphoses, 
X, for the story of Ganymede, and De Cons. Phil., IV Pr.I. See leaguer, 
(1932) and Dane, (1971). 
55) Leyerle, (1971). 
56) Rowland , (1968). 
57) See e.g. Economou, (1973) or Collingwood, (1960). 
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58) Cf. Pope's "The Temple of Fame", 
"But in the centre of the Hallowed choir, 
Six pompous columns o'er the Rest aspire; 
Around the Shrine itself of Fame they stand; 
Hold the chief Honours and the fame command." (178-181) 
Here the six ancient poets are pre-eminently famous over all other 
achievers, a bolder assertion than Chaucer's, and perhaps less 
perceptive of the melange of advertiser and commodity. See also Cawley, 
(1962). 
59) Jameson, (1981), p.35. 
60) Vance, (1979). 
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